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FORFEITURE OF THE CONFRONTATION
RIGHT IN GILES: JUSTICE SCALIA’S
FAINT-HEARTED FIDELITY TO THE
COMMON LAW
ELLEN LIANG YEE *
In Giles v. California 1 the Supreme Court issued a third Confrontation
Clause opinion in its Crawford line of cases. 2 In an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, the Giles Court reiterated its interpretive approach in
Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding.” 3 The Court’s decision
purports to hold that a defendant does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment
confrontation right when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the
defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial, unless the judge
finds that the defendant’s wrongful act was done with an intent to make the
witness unavailable to testify. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion interprets
intent to require purpose, only recognizing the forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception to the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation requirement when the
defendant “engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
testifying.”4

*

Associate Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. J.D., University of
Minnesota Law School. B.A., Yale University. Thanks to Ian Bartrum, Laurie Doré,
Charles Ehrhardt, George Fisher, Richard Friedman, Mark Kende, David Markell, David
McCord, Robert Mosteller, Margaret Raymond, Jim Rossi, Christopher Slobogin, Deborah
Tuerkheimer, and John Yetter for their comments on the paper.
1
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
2
In Crawford v. Washington, the Court articulated a new approach, holding that
admission of an extrajudicial testimonial statement by an unavailable declarant-witness
violated the Confrontation Clause unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant. 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). In Davis v. Washington, the Court began to
provide a more comprehensive definition of “testimonial” by delineating which police
interrogations invoke the protection of the Confrontation Clause. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
3
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 64).
4
Id. at 2683.
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In this Article, I demonstrate that the historical sources do not point
unequivocally to the conclusion Justice Scalia reaches in his majority
opinion. Further, given the fragmented opinions of the Justices in the case,
I argue that the reasoning of the case should be construed on the narrowest
grounds of commonality among the Justices. In so doing, courts should
examine intent in a more expansive way in light of the common law, rather
than in the rigid way described in Justice Scalia’s opinion. Especially in
cases involving domestic violence, gangs, and other cases involving
complex relationship dynamics between the defendant and the witness, a
defendant’s conduct that knowingly leads to the witness’s unavailability can
and should still trigger forfeiture, even if there is no overt purposive intent.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” 5 For many years, the Confrontation Clause was interpreted to
protect against admission of unreliable evidence under Ohio v. Roberts and
its progeny. 6 In Crawford v. Washington, a landmark opinion written by
Justice Scalia, the Court denounced the unpredictability of the Roberts
approach, which based the protection of the Sixth Amendment on the
“vagaries of the rules of evidence” and “amorphous notions of
‘reliability.’” 7 Crawford concluded that the Sixth Amendment bars
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at
trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.” 8
During the six years following Crawford, unpredictability has plagued
lower courts deciding evidence issues in criminal law cases. Much of this
lack of predictability centers on Crawford’s unnecessarily (and selfadmittedly) amorphous notion of “testimonial.” 9 Widespread disagreement
among lower courts in their application of Crawford has gradually required
the Court to start outlining the contours of what kinds of statements are
5

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the Court established a two-pronged
test to determine the admissibility of an unavailable declarant-witness’s former statement
offered against a criminal defendant. First, the prosecution must demonstrate the declarant’s
unavailability. Second, the hearsay statement may be admissible only if the statement bears
adequate “indicia of reliability” by either falling within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception”
or bearing “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 65–66.
7
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
8
Id. at 53–54.
9
Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition
of ‘testimonial.’”).
6
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“testimonial.” For example, two years after Crawford, the Supreme Court
offered some guidance in Davis v. Washington by defining more
specifically which police interrogations invoke the protection of the
Confrontation Clause. 10 But other important uncertainties have continued
to plague the Court’s new framework under Crawford.
One such uncertainty relates to what is known as the “forfeiture by
wrongdoing” doctrine. In evidence law, hearsay statements that are
ordinarily excluded may be admissible if the declarant is rendered
unavailable to be a trial witness due to the defendant’s wrongdoing. 11 This
exception has particularly important consequences where a witness is also a
victim, as is frequently the situation in domestic violence and child abuse
cases. In the constitutional context, the Crawford court suggested there
may be historical exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that are unrelated
to the Roberts reliability rationale. 12 For example, if declarants are
rendered unavailable by the defendant’s wrongdoing, their testimonial
hearsay statements may be admissible under the equitable rule of forfeiture
by wrongdoing. 13 As in the exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), the rationale for admitting
such evidence is not based on the theory that it is more reliable, but on the
grounds that the defendant should not benefit from his own wrongdoing. 14
Following Crawford, many courts also used the forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine to admit testimonial statements, but did so inconsistently. For
example, some courts required proof that the defendant intended to render

10
547 U.S. 813 (2006); see also Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the Ongoing Emergency:
A Pragmatic Approach to Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 729, 760–75, 785–92 (2008) (discussing how Crawford and Davis provide
only partial guidance to lower courts on these issues).
11
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). The rule applies to all parties in both civil and criminal
proceedings. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (1997) (“The wrongdoing
need not consist of a criminal act.”).
12
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; see also id. at 55 n.6 (suggesting that testimonial dying
declarations may be a sui generis exception).
13
Id. at 62 (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative
means of determining reliability.”) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59
(1879)).
14
Id. The rule “recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent
behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.’” FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)
advisory committee’s note (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984)).
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the victim unavailable as a trial witness, while other courts did not require
such proof. 15
In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court issued another Confrontation
Clause opinion written by Justice Scalia. 16 The Giles Court reiterated its
interpretive approach in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most
naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law,
admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.”17
Imposing that historical limitation on the scope of exceptions, the Court
held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was only an exception to the
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation requirement when the defendant
“engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.” 18 In
other words, a defendant does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment
confrontation right when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the
defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial, unless the judge
finds that the defendant’s wrongful act was for the purpose of making the
witness unavailable to testify.
Given the methodological preference for constitutional originalism in
Crawford, Davis, and Giles—particularly as reflected in Justice Scalia’s
opinions—this Article analyzes whether the historical claim underlying the
Court’s opinion in Giles is sound. 19 An accurate assessment of the history
requires an analysis of whether forfeiture of Sixth Amendment
15
Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 871–74 (2009). A majority of state courts did not
require proof of specific intent to silence a witness for forfeiture if the prosecution could
show that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the witness. However some courts
did require the prosecution to prove the specific intent to silence a witness in non-homicide
and homicide cases. Id.; see also Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is
the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759, 779 (2007) (“After Davis, courts
have continued to approve of the use of forfeiture in murders implicating domestic violence
without requiring any intent to prohibit [victims] from testifying at trial.”).
16
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
17
Id. at 2682 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
18
Id. at 2683.
19
Many scholars have analyzed and critiqued Justice Scalia’s use of originalism in
criminal procedure. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal
Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94
GEO. L.J. 183 (2005). In his 1988 lecture at the University of Cincinnati, Justice Scalia
himself discussed the merits and defects of originalism and nonoriginalism. Conceding that
“public flogging and hand branding” would not be sustained in present-day courts under the
Eighth Amendment even though these would not have been “cruel and unusual
punishments” at the time of the founding, he acknowledged that such an interpretation would
be “faint-hearted” originalism. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849, 861–62 (1989); see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of
“Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L.REV. 7 (2006).
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confrontation rights by wrongdoing requires proof of “intent” as understood
at the time of the founding. Understanding that this issue involves not only
constitutional law, but also evidence law and substantive criminal law, this
Article analyzes how all three bodies of law inform the interpretive question
presented by this issue. If the history is approached through the common
law, properly assessed, Giles’ very methodology does not clearly support its
outcome or the Court’s limited approach to forfeiture.
Part II will describe and discuss the recent line of Confrontation
Clause cases including Giles. Justice Scalia has taken the lead in directing
the Court down a new path of Confrontation Clause interpretation.
Beginning in Crawford and continuing in Davis and Giles, Justice Scalia’s
new framework has profoundly altered criminal trial procedure. 20
However, beneath the surface of the Court’s six to three ruling on the
outcome, the Giles Court was more fractured in its reasoning than the vote
tally indicates on its face.
Part III will briefly trace the development of the right of confrontation
from English and American sources of law. This Part will focus on
confrontation issues surrounding and including the forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception.
Part IV examines the historic and contemporary legal resources
regarding the mental state element. This Part will look not only at
constitutional law, but also at evidence law and substantive criminal law to
analyze the Giles Court’s interpretation of the forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine. By referencing these other related areas of law, this Part will
provide a more broad-based, solid foundation supported by the history of
the common law for lower courts to use as they are deciding whether the
prosecution has sufficiently shown that the defendant’s right to
confrontation should be forfeited.
Part V concludes by warning that constitutional interpretation of
criminal procedure cannot be divorced from a fair understanding of the
common law. That understanding cannot be reached through an inference
about the common law’s meaning based on assumptions about the legal
system, especially based on the lack of cases addressing issues that were
unlikely to have been litigated. Courts and litigants addressing forfeiture
would be ill-advised to rigidly apply the rule set forth by Justice Scalia’s
20

During this period, the Court had also decided in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford
did not apply retroactively on collateral review. 549 U.S. 406, 409 (2007). Since Giles, the
Court decided two cases on a related issue and two more cases are pending. See infra notes
43 and 45. Also, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed. Since Crawford,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor are no longer on the Court, and since Giles
and Melendez-Diaz, Justices Souter and Stevens are no longer on the Court.
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majority opinion in Giles without taking into account the proper common
law understanding of intent in the forfeiture context.
II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TRILOGY
The significance of the Confrontation Clause in American
jurisprudence greatly expanded in 1965 when the Court incorporated the
Sixth Amendment via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied it to the states.21 In the fifteen years following
incorporation, the Court addressed several interpretation and application
issues. 22 In the landmark case Ohio v. Roberts, the Court addressed
recurring issues regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence by creating
a two-prong test requiring both unavailability and reliability as predicates to
admission. 23 To prove reliability, the Court determined that the evidence
must either “fall[] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear
Finding that the
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 24
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are “designed to protect similar
values” 25 and “stem from the same roots,” 26 the Roberts Court constructed
an analysis that used the rules of hearsay as a means of determining the
constitutional admissibility of evidence. As the Court viewed the function
of the Confrontation Clause primarily as a safeguard against unreliable
evidence, it gradually diminished the unavailability requirement. 27 In the
cases following Roberts, the Court continued to entwine the constitutional
issue of confrontation with the evidentiary issue of hearsay reliability. As
this doctrine developed, many criticized it for diminishing defendants’
21

See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
See e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (holding that when the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints on the
use of his prior testimonial statements); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (declaring that
admission of an accomplice’s spontaneous comment that indirectly inculpated the defendant
did not violate the Confrontation Clause).
23
448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
24
Id. at 66.
25
Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)).
26
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
27
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). Where the four-year-old child abuse victim did
not testify at trial, the trial court did not make any finding that she was unavailable. Id. at
350. The Court held that the admission of the child’s hearsay statements under the
spontaneous declaration exception and the medical examination exception did not violate the
defendant’s confrontation rights. Id. at 348–51. The Court restricted the Roberts holding to
its facts stating: “Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary
part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements
were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.” Id. at 354 (citing United States v.
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
22
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rights to confrontation and for determining reliability with a standard that
was vague, arbitrary, and subjective. 28 Beginning with Crawford, the Court
has redirected the focus of its Confrontation Clause analysis to the common
law. Claiming that the Confrontation Clause “is most naturally read as a
reference to the right of confrontation at common law,” the Court has
attempted to outline the scope of that common law right and admit “only
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” 29
A. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

In Crawford v. Washington, the Court reevaluated its approach to the
Confrontation Clause and shifted the focus of the Clause from functioning
as a judicially-determined safeguard against unreliable evidence to
operating as a procedural trial right.30 In reviewing the history of the
Clause for clues to its intended meaning, the Court determined that “the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil
law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.” 31
In Crawford, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment barred
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at

28
See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1011 (1998); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 (1988); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation
Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L.
REV. 537 (2003).
29
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004); see also id. at 43 (“The founding
generation’s immediate source of the concept . . . was the common law.”).
30
541 U.S. at 42. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority. Id. at 38. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred with the judgment but disagreed with the
reformation of the Court’s approach to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 69 (“I dissent from
the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts.”). The facts of Crawford are as follows:
Michael Crawford was accused of stabbing a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife,
Sylvia. Id. at 38. Michael and Sylvia were arrested, taken to the police station, and
individually questioned. Id. Sylvia’s statement arguably suggested that Michael was the
aggressor and that the victim did not reach for, or did not have, a weapon at the time of the
stabbing. Id. at 39. At trial, Michael claimed the stabbing was in self-defense. Id. at 40. He
asserted his evidentiary marital privilege and prevented Sylvia from testifying. Id. (citing
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)). Unable to call her as a witness, the prosecution
sought to use Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement to rebut the defense. Id. The trial court
admitted Sylvia’s statement under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest
and held that it bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” therefore it did not violate
the Confrontation Clause as construed in Roberts. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980)).
31
Id. at 50.
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trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.” 32 While the rule appears strikingly
simple, its application has been anything but simple and clear. Crawford
did not provide courts sufficient guidance in determining which statements
are “testimonial,” and thus implicate the Confrontation Clause. 33
Furthermore, the Crawford Court suggested some exceptions might
apply to the testimonial rule. First, the Court acknowledged the
longstanding exception to the hearsay rule for dying declarations.34
Conceding that they may be testimonial, the Court declined to make an
explicit exception to the application of the Confrontation Clause for dying
declarations in Crawford. 35 Nevertheless, it indicated that such a singular

32
Id. at 53–54. But see id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“The Court’s distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted
in history than our current doctrine.”).
33
The Crawford Court decided that it would “leave for another day any effort to spell
out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’” Id. at 68. Nevertheless, the Court
described three formulations of “this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.” First, “ex parte
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially” is
testimonial. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). Second, “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions’” are testimonial. Id. at 51–52 (emphasis added) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Third, “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial” are testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52
(emphasis added). In Davis, the Court noted that the Crawford Court had “found it
unnecessary to endorse any of” those formulations. 547 U.S. at 822. Later, in MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, the Court stated that the Crawford Court’s opinion “described the
class of testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause” in those three
formulations. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009).
34
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. Note some jurisdictions further limit the use of such
statements in criminal cases to homicide prosecutions while others do not. See e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(2) (“Statement under belief of impending death. In a prosecution for homicide
or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the
declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant
believed to be impending death.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (“Evidence of a statement made
by a dying person respecting the cause and circumstances of his death is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement was made upon his personal knowledge and
under a sense of immediately impending death.”); see also Peter Nicolas, ‘I’m Dying to Tell
You What Happened’: The Admissibility of Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford,
37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 504–06 (2010) (analyzing the various definitions of dying
declarations in both constitutional and evidentiary contexts).
35
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, n.6.
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exception might be accepted on historical grounds. 36 Second, the Court
suggested that some testimonial statements may be admitted based on the
equitable principle underlying the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 37
B. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON

Two years later, the Supreme Court offered some guidance in Davis v.
Washington by outlining more specifically which police interrogations
invoke the protection of the Confrontation Clause.38 Under Davis, a court
must determine the primary purpose of the police interrogation by
objectively evaluating whether the circumstances indicate an “ongoing
The Court in Davis held that “[s]tatements are
emergency.” 39
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.” 40 In contrast, the Court found that “[statements] are
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.” 41
While it is now settled that the Confrontation Clause only applies to
testimonial statements, 42 the Supreme Court continues to be called into the
fray to settle differences among courts about where to define the contours of
36

Id. (“We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an
exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on historical
grounds, it is sui generis.”). Professor Friedman has offered a more theoretically sound basis
for the admissibility of testimonial dying declarations that is based on the rule of forfeiture
by wrongdoing. Richard Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L.
REV. 506 (1997).
37
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. The Court noted, “For example, the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. (citing
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)).
38
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
39
Id. at 822.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
The Crawford Court acknowledged that, in White v. Illinois, it had rejected the theory
that the Confrontation Clause was applicable only to testimonial statements. 541 U.S. at 61
(citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352–53 (1992)). However, in a footnote in Davis, the
Court expressed for the first time that it “overruled Roberts in Crawford by restoring the
unavailability and cross-examination requirements.” 547 U.S. at 825 n.4. To reinforce its
intentions, the Court in Whorton v. Bockting confirmed it intended to overrule Roberts in
Crawford. 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007) (holding that Crawford did not apply retroactively on
collateral review).
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testimonial statements. 43 In Crawford, Justice Scalia criticized the Court’s
reliability analysis in Ohio v. Roberts for being “inherently, and therefore
permanently, unpredictable.” 44 Unfortunately, as Justice Thomas foresaw,
the Davis majority’s primary-purpose test is no more predictable than the
Roberts reliability inquiry. 45 Police officers who report to a crime scene
will investigate in order to “both to respond to the emergency situation and

43
For example, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts the Court recently held that a
laboratory report is testimonial. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). Four days later, the Court
granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia to resolve whether, “[i]f a State allows a prosecutor
to introduce a certificate of forensic laboratory analysis without presenting the testimony of
the analyst who prepared the certificate, . . . the state avoid[s] violating the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment by providing that the accused has the right to call the analyst
as his own witness.” Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert granted
sub nom., Briscoe v. Virginia, 77 U.S.L.W. 3701 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 07-11191). The
Court vacated and remanded Briscoe for “further proceedings not inconsistent with the
opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.” Briscoe v. Virginia, 78 U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 2010), vacating and remanding 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008) (citation omitted). On
remand, the Virginia Supreme Court held that its statutory scheme was unconstitutional.
Cypress v. Commonwealth, Record Nos. 070815, 070817, 2010 WL 3583988, at *7 (Va.
Sept. 16, 2010). Most recently, on September 28, 2010 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, which construes the Confrontation Clause in light of
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1
(N.M. 2010), cert granted sub nom Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 79 U.S.L.W. 3194 (Sep. 28,
2010). In Bullcoming, the Court will address “whether the Confrontation Clause permits the
prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst through
the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the
laboratory analysis described in the statements.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Bullcoming, 79 U.S.L.W. 3158 (2010) (09-10876), 2010 WL 3761875, at *i.
44
541 U.S. at 68 n.10.
45
Davis, 547 U.S. at 834. “Today, a mere two years after the Court decided Crawford, it
adopts an equally unpredictable test, under which district courts are charged with divining
the ‘primary purpose’ of police interrogations” (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Thomas went on to note, “The Court’s standard is not only
disconnected from history and unnecessary to prevent abuse; it also yields no predictable
results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law.” Id. at 838.
Sure enough, to clarify an issue following Davis, the Court granted certiorari and heard
oral argument on October 5, 2010 in Michigan v. Bryant. 130 S. Ct. 1685 (Mar. 1, 2010)
(No. 09-150) (mem); Transcript of Oral Argument, Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (No. 09-150). In
Bryant, the Court is addressing whether

preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the perpetrator and circumstances of the
shooting are nontestimonial because “made under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency,” that emergency including not only aid to a wounded victim, but also the prompt
identification and apprehension of an apparently violent and dangerous individual.

Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 2138 (2010) (09-150), 2010 WL
1776430, at *i.
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to gather evidence.” 46 It will rarely be possible to assign primacy to either
“of these two ‘largely unverifiable motives.’”47
C. GILES V. CALIFORNIA

Justice Scalia authored a third Confrontation Clause opinion in Giles v.
California. 48 In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court sided with Giles
in holding that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation
Clause required proof that a defendant intended to silence the witness.49
In the case underlying the appeal in Giles, Dwayne Giles was
convicted of first-degree murder for admittedly shooting his ex-girlfriend,
Brenda Avie. 50 Giles unsuccessfully claimed the shooting was justified as
self-defense. 51 At trial, both sides presented evidence of prior violence
relevant to the self-defense issues. Defense witnesses described how Avie
had shot at someone, threatened people with a knife, made verbal threats of
harm, and vandalized Giles’ home and car. 52 Giles testified that on the day
of the killing, Avie had threatened to kill both him and his new girlfriend.53
To rebut the defendant’s self-defense claim, the prosecution presented
evidence of Giles’ physical attack against Avie just weeks before the
killing. 54
An officer testified that weeks before the killing Avie said Giles
accused her of having an affair, “grabbed her by the shirt, lifted her off the
floor, and began to choke her . . . .” When she “broke free and fell to the

46

Id. at 839.
Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984)).
48
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). On remand, the California Court of Appeals reversed Giles’s
conviction. People v. Giles, No. B166937, 2009 WL 457832 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2009).
49
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority, but there were distinct differences
among the Justices regarding the reasoning for the result. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito
each filed a concurring opinion. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693–94. Justice Souter filed an
opinion concurring in part in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2694. Justice Breyer
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined. Id. at 2695.
50
Id. at 2682. Giles and Avie dated for several years. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433,
435 (Cal. 2007). Avie had been shot six times and was not carrying a weapon. Giles, 128
S.Ct. at 2681. “One wound was consistent with Avie’s holding her hand up at the time she
was shot, another was consistent with her having turned to her side, and a third was
consistent with her having been shot while lying on the ground.” Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 2681–82; see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
the prosecutor introduced Avie’s unconfronted statements to rebut the defendant’s
affirmative self defense claim and impeach the defendant’s testimony).
47
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floor, Giles punched her in the face and head.” 55 The officer testified that
Avie described how “after she broke free again, [Giles] opened a folding
knife, held it about three feet away from her, and threatened to kill her if he
found her cheating on him.” 56
On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of Avie’s hearsay
statements describing the alleged previous attack violated his Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights because the statements were testimonial
and were not subject to cross-examination.57 The California Court of
Appeals sided with the State, holding that admission of Avie’s
unconfronted statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because
Crawford acknowledged exceptions that were recognized at the time of the
founding, including the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 58 The
California Court of Appeals found that Giles had forfeited his right to
confront Avie by wrongfully intentionally killing her, which made her
unavailable to testify. 59 The California Supreme Court affirmed. 60
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Giles Court cited
Crawford as precedential authority for establishing two common law
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause requirement. 61 Using dicta from
Crawford, the Giles majority solidified the parameters for exceptions to the
confrontation requirement by restricting them to those “most naturally read
as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” 62
The first exception the Giles Court asserted it had previously
acknowledged was for dying declarations, which the Court described as
“declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and
55

Id. at 2681–82.
Id.
57
People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The United States
Supreme Court accepted without analysis that Avie’s statements to the police were
testimonial because the State did not dispute the issue. Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682. As a matter
of evidence law, Avie’s statements were not admitted under a forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception to the hearsay rule. Instead, California evidence law provided an exception to the
hearsay exclusionary rule for statements describing the infliction or threat of physical injury
on an unavailable declarant when the statements are deemed trustworthy. Id. (citing CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 2008)).
58
Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 847.
59
Id. at 850.
60
People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 435 (Cal. 2007), vacated, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
61
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682. Crawford did not actually decide these issues. See
discussion infra notes 63–66.
62
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)). “We have previously
acknowledged that two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even
though they were unconfronted.” Id. at 2682 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6., 62).
56
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aware that he was dying.” 63 In truth, the Crawford Court explicitly avoided
determining how it might apply the Confrontation Clause to dying
declarations by stating, “We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth
Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations.
If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”64
In any case, the Court found that Avie’s statements did not fall into this
exception.
Next, the Court outlined a second common law exception, the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, which “permitted the introduction of
statements of a witness who was ‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or
procurement’ of the defendant.” 65 The Court in Crawford did not hold that
forfeiture by wrongdoing was an exception to the constitutional
confrontation requirement. Rather, forfeiture by wrongdoing is mentioned
once in Crawford, but only as an example of an exception “to the
Confrontation Clause that make[s] no claim to be a surrogate means of
assessing reliability,” but instead is based on “essentially equitable
grounds.” 66
Consistent with the originalist interpretation method that Justice Scalia
applied in Crawford and Davis, his opinion in Giles examined historical
evidence to decipher the meaning and application of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine at the time of the founding. His majority opinion
approaches the historical analysis incrementally. Using language from
cases decided in 1666, 1692, and 1851,67 and other sources including
treatises from 1762, 1791, and 1804,68 the Court found evidence that courts
63

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
65
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citations omitted).
66
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“For example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which
we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”) (citing Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)).
67
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing Lord Morley’s Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771
(H.L.1666); Harrison’s Case, (1692) 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H.L.1692) (“made him keep
away”); Queen v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (K.B.) (“kept away”)).
68
Id. at 2683 (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE P LEAS OF THE CROWN 425
(4th ed. 1762); THOMAS PEAKE, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 62 (2d ed. 1804)
(“sent” away); 1 GEOFFREY GILBERT, LAW OF EVIDENCE 214 (1791) (“detained and kept back
from appearing by the means and procurement of the prisoner”)). The cited publication
dates of these texts are relevant but not conclusive to prove that they reflect a
contemporaneous statement of the law. For example, Gilbert’s treatise was first published in
1754, but was written earlier. He died in 1726, and other evidence suggests he wrote the
treatise in the early 1700s. George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J.
575, 617 n.161 (1997). The 1762 Hawkins treatise was first published in 1716 and 1721 and
64

1508

ELLEN LIANG YEE

[Vol. 100

had admitted testimonial statements previously made at a coroner’s
inquest 69 and at Marian bail and committal hearings 70 if the declarant was
dead, unable to travel, or unavailable due to the defendant’s wrongful
procurement of the witness’s absence. 71 The step-by-step shifts in Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Giles were so gradual, and scan such a vast period of
history, that they did not appear to change direction.
In the end, Justice Scalia used these few sources to construct a
forfeiture rule that requires the prosecution to prove the defendant had the
specific mental state of purposely causing the witness’s absence. His
analysis began with the English common law doctrine that allowed
statements of an unavailable witness to be introduced if the witness was
“detained” or “kept away” by the “means or procurement” of the
defendant. 72 While admitting that these terms only “suggest” that the
forfeiture exception applied when the defendant engaged in conduct
“designed to prevent the witness from testifying,” 73 this was the
interpretation that Justice Scalia selected. In fact, each of the three
alternatives: (1) detained, (2) kept away by means of the defendant, or (3)
kept away by procurement of the defendant, could either be broadly
construed to include all circumstances where the defendant merely caused
the witness’s resulting absence, or narrowly construed to only include
circumstances when the defendant both caused the absence and intended the
absence. Either interpretation, without more, is equally reasonable.
To resolve this ambiguity, Justice Scalia selectively gathered historic
resources to tip the balance. 74 However, these resources have limited value
as authority for determining the meaning of the language quoted to
subsequent editions were published without significant changes. Thomas Y. Davies,
Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of the Giles Forfeiture Exception Were or
Were Not “Established at the Time of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 624
n.94 (2009).
69
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at 770–71).
70
Criminal procedure statutes enacted during the reign of Queen Mary I of England
required justices of the peace make written records of the sworn statements of witnesses of a
felony at the time of an arrest. Those statements were later made available to the felony trial
court. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 128–29 (2005)
(citing the Marian statutes 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c.13 (1554–1555) and 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c.10
(1555)).
71
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citations omitted).
72
Id. (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at 771; Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St.
Tr. at 851 (“made him keep away”); Scaife, 117 Q.B. at 242, 117 Eng. Rep. at 1273 (“kept
away”)).
73
Id.
74
See Davies, supra note 68.
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articulate the common law rule in the English opinions. None of the
reference dictionaries are contemporaneous with the judicial opinions or
treatise texts. To investigate the historical meaning of the term “procure,”
for example, Justice Scalia referred to an edition of Webster’s Dictionary
published in 1828, over one hundred and sixty years after the Lord Morley
opinion was written. 75 Moreover, it is an American dictionary, rather than
an English one. The subsequent reference to the Oxford English Dictionary
is similarly limited in relevance. The Giles opinion used only one of
several definitions of “procure” from the edition published in 1989, more
than three hundred and twenty years after the Lord Morley opinion. 76
Similarly, the term “means” could either be broadly construed to
include circumstances where the defendant caused the witness’s resulting
absence, or narrowly to only include a result that the defendant caused and
intended to achieve. The Court conceded that either interpretation is
equally reasonable by stating “while the term ‘means’ could sweep in all
cases in which a defendant caused a witness to fail to appear, it can also
connote that a defendant forfeits confrontation rights when he uses an
intermediary for the purpose of making a witness absent.”77 To support this
second, narrower interpretation of the 1666 usage of the term “means,” the
Court cited not only the 1989 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, but
also the first edition of Webster’s American Dictionary, which was
published in 1869. 78
Justice Scalia’s selective use of particular versions of dictionaries
seriously undermined the credibility of any commitment to historical

75
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining “procure” as “to contrive and effect” and defining
“procure” as “to get; to gain; to obtain; as by request, loan, effort, labor or purchase”).
76
Id. (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed.1989) (def.I(3)) (defining
“procure” as “[t]o contrive or devise with care (an action or proceeding); to endeavour to
cause or bring about (mostly something evil) to or for a person”)). For example, the next
entry defines “procure” as “[t]o bring about by care or pains; also (more vaguely) to bring
about, cause, effect, produce.” 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989)
(def.II(4)). This definition encompasses a broader scope of conduct, including conduct
which could simply “bring about, cause, effect, [or] produce” a result. This range of conduct
may be less motivated by the actor’s intent. More strikingly, Justice Scalia did not use
definition II(6)(b) which is labeled as the entry specifically used in law. This entry defines
“procure” as “[t]o induce privately, to suborn, to bribe (a witness, juryman, etc.).” Id. at def.
II(6)(b).
77
Id.
78
Id. (citing 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 516 (2d ed. 1989) (“[A] person who
intercedes for another or uses influence in order to bring about a desired result”); NOAH
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 822 (1869) (“That
through which, or by the help of which, an end is attained”)).
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authority. 79 The dictionaries from 1828, 1868, and 1989 arguably allow for
either broad or narrow definitions of “procurement” and “means.” 80 Yet
Justice Scalia concluded the history of the terms pointed unequivocally to a
narrow interpretation of the rule. This heavy and selective reliance on
dictionaries is hardly a unique feature to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Giles;
his use of dictionaries to reach controversial textual interpretations across a
range of areas of the law is well-chronicled. 81
In addition, Justice Scalia determined that cases and treatises
purportedly contemporaneous with the founding “indicate that a purposebased definition” of the terms governed.82 Citing treatises from 1816 and
1814 and a case from 1819 that use the language “means and contrivance,”
Justice Scalia gradually added the term “contrivance” into the analysis.83
Then referring back to the 1869 and 1989 dictionaries, now with the word
“contrivance” as a guide, Justice Scalia built his case for applying a
purpose-based interpretation. 84 To bolster his position, he selected an 1858
treatise. This treatise stated that the forfeiture rule applied when a witness
“had been kept out of the way by the prisoner, or by some one on the
prisoner’s behalf, in order to prevent him from giving evidence against

79
A couple of decades earlier, Justice Scalia himself recognized the significant problem
of originalism was accessing and analyzing sufficient relevant and reliable material to
properly apply it as an interpretive method. Scalia, supra note 19, at 856–57.
80
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989) (def.I(3));
N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 822 (1869)).
81
See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 315–30 (1998) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries
conflicts with the goals of ordinary meaning textualism); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries
and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (1994) (comparing Justice
Scalia’s use of dictionaries with the Court’s); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 363–73 (1994) (documenting
Justice Scalia’s success in persuading the Court to rely less on legislative history and more
on dictionaries and arguing that both trends have undermined the Chevron doctrine in
administrative law).
82
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683–84.
83
Id. at 2684 (citing Drayton v. Wells, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott. & McC.) 409, 411 (S.C. 1819)
(“kept away by the contrivance of the opposite party”); 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 81 (1816) (“kept away by the means and contrivance of the
prisoner”); S. M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 165 (1814) (“kept out of
the way by the means and contrivance of the prisoner”)).
84
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684, citing 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 47 (1869) (“inventing, devising or planning,”); 3 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 850 (2d ed. 1989) (“ingeniously endeavoring the accomplishment of anything,”
“the bringing to pass by planning, scheming, or stratagem,” or “[a]daption of means to an
end; design, intention”).
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him.” 85 Without evidence to the contrary, the Court reasoned that this is the
correct interpretation.
Finally, the Court examined the “manner in which the rule was
applied” and decided that this evidence “makes plain” that unconfronted
testimony would not have been admitted without a showing that “the
defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.” 86 For support, the
Court cited several cases where a victim’s statements were excluded
because the dying declaration foundation was insufficient, or because the
procedures for statements taken according to the Marian bail statutes were
improperly followed. In each of these situations, the Court asserted that the
prosecution failed to argue that forfeiture by wrongdoing was an alternative
exception. 87 From this information, the Court deduced that the prosecution
did not make the argument because the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine
required a showing that “the defendant intended to prevent a witness from
testifying,” which was clearly not present.88
The Court examined two English spousal homicide cases to reach this
conclusion. First, a 1789 case in which the judge said dying declarations
and depositions taken according to the Marian bail and committal statutes
were admissible, but other out of court statements were not because “the
prisoner [] had no opportunity of contradicting the facts [they] contain[].” 89
Two years later, a court excluded a homicide victim’s sworn deposition
because the defendant had not been present and thus did not “have, as he is
entitled to have, the benefit of cross-examination.” 90 In both of these cases,
the Court noted that the prosecution did not use forfeiture as a second line
of argument for admission. In addition, the majority asserted that until
1985, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in American courts required
“deliberate witness tampering.” 91
In sum, the majority demonstrated that there were two established
exceptions to the confrontation requirement—statements taken according to
proper Marian depositions and dying declarations. The majority also cited
85

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684 (citing EDMUND POWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 166 (1st ed. 1858)).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 2685–86 (citations omitted).
88
Id. at 2684.
89
Id. at 2684–85 (citing King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353
(1789)).
90
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2685 (citing King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562, 168 Eng. Rep.
383, 384 (1791)).
91
Id. at 2687 (referencing United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985))
(holding that a defendant who killed a peace offer while resisting arrest “waived his right to
cross-examine [the peace officer] by killing him”).
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authority to establish that there was a third exception to the confrontation
requirement—forfeiture by wrongdoing. To establish the limited scope of
the forfeiture doctrine, the majority attempted to show that forfeiture was
not argued as an alternative in cases where the two established
confrontation exceptions were at issue. Selectively using the language and
facts of these cases, the majority asserted that forfeiture was not raised
because the historical forfeiture doctrine required proof of the defendant’s
purpose to prevent a witness from testifying. Surmising that such a purpose
was not provable in these cases, the Giles Court concluded this is the reason
the prosecution did not even attempt to pursue this route. While not a
wholly unreasonable inference, the dissent later demonstrated that this was
not a logical, singular conclusion based on the available information. 92
Finally, the Court proceeded to turn its own logic on its head by using
evidence law and the “modern view” of interpretation of evidence law to
support its historical interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. 93 After
vigorously asserting that the historical scope of the constitutional doctrine
was determinative, the Giles Court confoundingly used these modern
evidence references as authority. 94 Quoting the Federal Rule of Evidence
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, which was adopted
in 1997, the Court claimed that the rule “codifies the forfeiture doctrine.” 95
As the third major Confrontation Clause case, Giles revealed a highly
fractured Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia used historical
research to interpret the meaning of the forfeiture doctrine at the time of the
founding. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito signed on to all aspects of
Scalia’s opinion. Chief Justice Roberts was the only Justice who did not
write separately. Justices Thomas and Alito each wrote separately to
discuss whether the declarant’s statements were testimonial despite the
clear exclusion of this issue by both parties. While Justice Thomas
concurred in the result and, indirectly, in the rationale, he did so only
92

Id. at 2704–05 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “But the majority’s house of cards has no
foundation; it is built on what is at most common-law silence on the subject.” Id. at 2705
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 2687–88.
94
Id. at 2687 (citing 85 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 8:134 (3d ed. 2007); 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.03[7][b] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); 2
KENNETH S. BROWN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 176 (6th ed. 2006)). The commentators
come out this way because the dissent’s claim that knowledge is sufficient to show intent is
emphatically not the modern view. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.2 (2d ed. 2003) (footnote omitted).
95
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 833). Evidence codes in twelve
states contain a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception. Id. at 2688 n.2.
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because the “opinion accurately reflects [the Court’s] Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence where the applicability of that Clause is not at issue.” 96
Under Justice Thomas’ framework, the statement itself was not even
testimonial. Consistent with his position in Crawford and Davis, he
restated that only formalized statements should be testimonial, and Avie’s
statements here were not. 97 Justice Alito similarly questioned whether
Avie’s statements were testimonial under these circumstances, but given
that the issue was not raised, agreed with the Court’s forfeiture doctrine
analysis. 98
Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in part, but grounded their
support for the limit on the forfeiture exception based on the rationale rather
than solely on the historical record. Describing the Court’s historical
analysis as “sound” and both the Court’s and the dissent’s examination of
the historical record as “careful,” 99 Justices Souter and Ginsburg concluded
that history alone was not dispositive “when the crime charged occurred in
an abusive relationship or was its culminating act . . . .” 100
Their concurrence supported the interpretation that the forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception requires an additional judicial determination by a
preponderance of the evidence of defendant’s intent to prevent the witness
from testifying. 101 Justice Souter argued that two aspects of the historical
background supported the majority’s position. In his view, the historical
sources substantially indicated that the Sixth Amendment was “meant to
require some degree of intent to thwart the judicial process before thinking
it reasonable to hold the confrontation right forfeited . . . .” 102 Further, these
sources indicated that “the element of intention would normally be satisfied
by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic
abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help,
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process.”103

96

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2693.
98
Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring). This position is seemingly inconsistent with his
former position in Davis where he joined the majority opinion which held in the Hammon
case that a similarly situated victim statement to a responding police officer was testimonial.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 815.
99
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
100
Id. at 2694–95.
101
Id. at 2694. “Equity demands something more than this near circularity before the
right to confrontation is forfeited, and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the
witness from testifying. Cf. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.” Id. (citation modified).
102
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695.
103
Id. at 2695.
97
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Justices Ginsburg and Souter did not join the section of the opinion
that characterized the dissent as “a thinly veiled invitation to overrule
Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the regime of
Ohio v. Roberts under which the Court would create the exceptions that it
thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee,
regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood.” 104 In this
section, Justice Scalia rejected the dissent’s approach of “reason[ing] from
the ‘basic purposes and objectives’ of the forfeiture doctrine.” 105 This
section further criticized the dissent for diminishing a defendant’s right to
confrontation because the defendant’s ability to exercise the right would be
determined according to a trial court’s concept of what is “fair.” 106
Justice Breyer wrote a sharp dissent that was joined by Justices
Stevens and Kennedy. However, the dissent started with one important
point of agreement. Justice Breyer agreed that the historical sources “make
clear that ‘forfeiture by wrongdoing’ satisfies Crawford’s requirement that
the Confrontation Clause be ‘read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law’ and that ‘any exception’ must be ‘established
at the time of the founding.’” 107 Reviewing the same historical sources as
the majority, Justice Breyer determined that the forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception was in fact established at the time of the founding. 108
The crucial difference between the majority and the dissent lies in
outlining the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
Confrontation Clause. 109 Justice Breyer enumerated three reasons why
Avie’s statements should fall within the scope of the exception to the
Confrontation Clause: (1) the common law history, (2) the principles of
criminal law and evidence, and (3) the pragmatic need for a rule that can be
fairly applied by courts. 110 The dissent effectively dismantled the
majority’s logic and reasoning, but offered a somewhat unsatisfying
approach to the problem. Concluding that the history was too sparse or
unclear to determine what the scope of the forfeiture doctrine was at the
104

Id. at 2692. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg concurred with the Giles
opinion, but did not join Part II.D.2. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694.
105
Id. at 2691.
106
Id. at 2692. Justice Scalia warned that if the forfeiture doctrine is not narrowly
construed, it would risk depriving a defendant of a fair jury trial because the court’s pretrial
ruling on admissibility of the testimonial statement is based on a judicial determination of
the defendant’s wrongdoing. Id.
107
Id. at 2696 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54
(2004)).
108
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2696.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 2695–2709.
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time of the founding, the dissent simply attempted to demonstrate why a
broad forfeiture doctrine would be reasonable and desirable in the present.
III. FORFEITURE AND ITS HISTORY
Many legal historians have researched the origins of the Confrontation
Clause. 111 Early evidence of the conceptual foundation of the confrontation
right has been recognized as far back as the Roman era.112 Scholars have
noted that early English jurisprudence arguably recognized a form of the
right of confrontation even before the right to a jury trial.113
Early American historical documents only rarely mention the right of
confrontation. 114 The historical record reflects that the American right of
confrontation was recognized first at the state level. Several states had
adopted declarations of rights that guaranteed a right of confrontation
before the Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791.115 In addition, the
Supreme Court has often recognized that a common law right of
111

See, e.g., William H. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due
Process—A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6
CONN. L. REV. 529, 532 (1974); Davies, supra note 68; Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M.
Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause,
34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 483–84 (1994); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the
Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995); Robert Kry,
Forfeiture and Cross-Examination, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577 (2009); Murl A. Larkin,
The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67 (1969); Peter Tillers,
Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of History in Judicial Interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for
Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 110, 2005).
112
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015–16 (1988) (quoting Acts 25:16).
113
Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB.
L. 381, 384–87 (1959) (cited in Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016).
114
Jonakait, supra note 111, at 77 n.4 (“Congressional intent is virtually impossible to
determine since ‘[t]he clause was debated for a mere five minutes before its adoption.’”)
(quoting Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54
S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 332 n.181 (1981)).
115
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 48 (2004) (citing Virginia Declaration of
Rights § 8 (1776); Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § IX (1776); Delaware Declaration of
Rights § 14 (1776); Maryland Declaration of Rights § XIX (1776); North Carolina
Declaration of Rights § VII (1776); Vermont Declaration of Rights Ch. I, § X (1777);
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XII (1780); New Hampshire Bill of Rights § XV
(1783), all reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
235, 265, 278, 282, 287, 323, 342, 377 (1971)). In addition, scholars have questioned the
Court’s focus on 1791 as the relevant date given that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to
the states until it was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. See, e.g.,
Lininger, supra note 15, at 877; Nicolas, supra note 34, at 504–06; Myrna Raeder,
Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and
Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2005).
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confrontation preceded the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. 116 Beyond
this, scholars have found little documentation of the Framers’ intended
meaning and application of the Clause. 117
Furthermore, in the years following the ratification of the federal
Confrontation Clause, the Court was infrequently petitioned to interpret and
apply the right. The first major case arose in 1895, more than a hundred
years after ratification. In Mattox v. United States, the Court held that the
confrontation right is not absolute. 118 The Court explained that the right
“must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case.” 119
Beginning with Crawford, 120 Justice Scalia has taken hold of the reins
of Confrontation Clause interpretation and led the Court steadily in a new
direction. Rather than using or building on the existing doctrine developed
in Ohio v. Roberts and its progeny, 121 Justice Scalia has advanced an
interpretation based on the history and origins of the Clause and used this
“original” meaning to interpret the Clause’s application to the present day
facts. Using the “right of confrontation at common law” to guide his
interpretive analysis, 122 Justice Scalia has attempted to ground the Court’s
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in historical authority.
While in theory this is a reasonable approach, in practice it is much
more difficult and complicated to implement. 123 Certainly one logical
method to determine the meaning of a text is to interpret it according to
what the text meant at the time it was written. However, when there is little
relevant data available to analyze, the resulting determination is less
reliable. Scholars have critiqued the Court’s historical research and
analysis in Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause trilogy: Crawford, 124
Davis, 125 and Giles. 126
116

Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926). See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
See Davies, supra note 70, at 120–206.
118
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250 (1895) (finding no Confrontation Clause
violation to admit the reporter’s stenographic notes of two deceased witnesses’ crossexamined prior testimony at defendant’s retrial for murder).
119
Id. at 243.
120
Evidence of Justice Scalia’s viewpoint can be found earlier in his concurrence with
Justice Thomas in 1992, where he suggested that the Court’s Confrontation jurisprudence
“has evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause
itself.” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
121
See supra Part II.
122
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
123
Davies, supra note 70, at 105–07.
124
The Brooklyn Law Review published several articles in its seventy-first volume from a
symposium held in 2005 entitled “Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the
117
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Justice Scalia’s approach to the forfeiture doctrine—the notion that
defendants may forfeit the protections of the Confrontation Clause to the
extent they intend to render a witness unavailable to testify at trial—
illustrates the limits of his constitutional methodology and its unintended
consequences for criminal procedure.
A. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CURIOUS DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMON LAW
OF FORFEITURE

Justice Scalia’s historical analysis led him to the firm conclusion that
the evidence points to only one interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine: that
the State must prove the defendant’s purposive intent to keep the declarant
from testifying at trial. 127 Beneath this conclusion, however, is a deep
analytical flaw. Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine is
simply not clearly supported by the historical sources, as the only critical
cases he references are silent rather than determinative on the issue of
forfeiture.
Furthermore, the evidence he presents to support his
interpretation of the common law forfeiture doctrine is incomplete and
overbroad, and as a result his analysis of the doctrine is arbitrarily selective.
Both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent
mine the history of the forfeiture doctrine in the context of the
Confrontation Clause for nuggets of evidence to analyze the scope and
applicability of the doctrine. The same historical record, however, leads
Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer to reach differing conclusions. As Justices
Souter and Ginsburg observe in their concurrence, “early cases on the
exception were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question
here.” 128 Justice Breyer also recognized the indeterminacy of the historical

Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past—Can History Define the Structure of the
Confrontation Clause?” See e.g., Davies, supra note 70; Randolph N. Jonakait, The TooEasy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005);
Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide A Stable Foundation For Confrontation Doctrine?
71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 77–83 (2005).
125
Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford–Davis Testimonial Formulation of the Scope of the
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352–53 (2007); see also Randolph N.
Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier's
Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 471, 474–77 (2007)
(analyzing the Court’s incorrect use of Brasier in Crawford and Davis to discuss the
common law right of confrontation).
126
Davies, supra note 68, at 624 n.94.
127
See supra Part II.C.
128
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring in part).
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record, noting “the possibility that there are too few old records available
for us to draw firm conclusions.” 129
The legal historian John Langbein has previously cautioned,
“continuing confusion about the very nature of the law of evidence at the
end of the eighteenth century underscores how primitive and undertheorized
the subject then was.” 130 If the historical meaning of common law doctrine
were determinative, an accurate interpretation would not only require
dictionary definitions—as Justice Scalia draws on—but would require an
assessment of the rules and the context of their application in the legal
system. For example, many of the leading cases involving forfeiture
doctrine are, in modern terms, “domestic violence” cases. This type of
conduct was regarded substantially differently by the justice system at the
time of the founding. As Justice Breyer recognizes, “200 years ago, it
might have been seen as futile for women to hale their abusers before a
Marian magistrate where they would make such a statement.”131 Conduct
that is now criminally punishable may not have been criminal at the time,
and thus not even “wrongdoing” in some other sense. 132
Even Justice Scalia seemed to acknowledge in his majority opinion
that acts of domestic violence may “dissuade a victim from resorting to
outside help,” including “prevent[ing] testimony to police officers or
cooperation in criminal prosecutions.” 133 Justice Scalia, however, narrows
forfeiture to only acts “intended to dissuade,” or acts that have the purpose
of thwarting criminal investigations and testimony. 134 In Giles, Justice
Scalia asserts unequivocally that “[c]ases and treatises of the time indicate
that a purpose-based definition of the terms ‘kept back,’ ‘detained,’ by
129

Id. at 2704 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 248 (2003); see
also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2704 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2703–04; see, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (Phil. Law), 459
(1868) (per curiam) (“We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain
upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.”).
132
See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital
Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (discussing the history of the common law marital rape
exemption). Some physical violence towards wives was also not punishable. “[T]he old
writers say that a husband may chastise his wife with a rod no thicker than this thumb . . . .”
Id. at 1389 n.43 (citing 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 815 (John
Houston Merrill ed., 1888)); see also Raeder, supra note 115, at 312 n.6 (2005) (citing 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 (1765)). But see e.g,
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880–1920, 77 U.
COLO. L. REV. 101 (2006) (showing that men who killed their intimate partners were often
more severely punished than women who did the same).
133
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
134
Id.
130
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‘means or procurement’ governed.” 135 However, a more careful and
complete examination of the law around 1791 reveals that the meaning of
these terms was much less clear and was not as narrow as he suggests.
B. PLACING THE HISTORY OF FORFEITURE DOCTRINE IN CONTEXT

As Justice Breyer states in his Giles dissent: “I know of no instance in
which this Court has drawn a conclusion about the meaning of a commonlaw rule solely from the absence of cases showing the contrary—at least not
where there are other plausible explanations for that absence. And there are
such explanations here.” 136 The limited historical record examined by both
the majority and dissent is insufficient to concretely define the contours of
the doctrine. But ultimately, Justice Breyer is correct on the essential point:
“[T]he majority’s house of cards has no foundation; it is built on what is at
most common-law silence on the subject.” 137
Important English cases on the law of forfeiture were decided in the
period spanning 1666 to 1851, but do not lend clear support to Justice
Scalia’s narrow definition of forfeiture. For example, Lord Morley’s Case,
decided in 1666, held that a prior testimonial statement would be admissible
if the witness was “dead or unable to travel” or “detained by the means or
procurement of the prisoner.” 138 While the court did not admit the absent
witness’s statement, the court did not do so based on an inquiry into the
defendant’s intent regarding the absence. The court simply found there was
an insufficient connection between the defendant and the witness’s absence
based on evidence that the witness had run away and told others that he
would not attend the trial.139
In Harrison’s Case, the court did not require proof of the defendant’s
purpose to prevent the witnesses from testifying. The court admitted the
absent witness’s former statement even when it was not firmly proven that
the defendant himself was responsible for the witness’s absence. The court
attributed the witness’s absence to two occurrences, that “a gentleman” had
come to offer the witness money “to be kind to Mr. Harrison” and that the
witness “was inticed [sic] away by three soldiers” and had not since

135

Id. at 2683–84.
Id. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137
Id. at 2705.
138
Lord Morley’s Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770 (H. L.) (discussing coroner’s
out-of-court “examinations” of witnesses).
139
Id. at 777.
136
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returned. 140 On this evidence, the court found sufficient evidence to show
that the defendant used “ill practice to take [the witness] out of the way.” 141
Similarly in Lord Fenwick’s Case, the court admitted an absent
witness’s prior statement because the defendant or others had “by
fraudulent and indirect means, procured a [prior witness] to withdraw
himself . . . .” 142 However, again, because the court could not determine
whether the defendant was directly responsible for the witness’s absence,
the court did not require proof of the defendant’s specific intent to cause the
absence. 143
By contrast, in Queen v. Scaife, the court did not admit an absent
witness’s prior statement without a minimum connection between the
defendant and the person who “resorted to a contrivance to keep the witness
out of the way . . . .” 144 Because evidence showed that only the third codefendant was connected to the witness’s absence, the court did not enquire
into the defendant’s specific intent. 145
As Justice Breyer emphasized in his dissent, other cases used by the
majority, such as Woodcock and Dingler are not relevant to assessing the
requisite mental state of the defendant for forfeiture, as they were analyzed
as improper Marian depositions or dying declarations. 146 Since mental state
was not the touchstone of the application of forfeiture to these cases, it is a
serious stretch to read them, as does Justice Scalia, as requiring a purposive
mental state on the part of the defendant to make the witness unavailable as
a predicate to forfeiture.147
Early American cases similarly do not clearly support Justice Scalia’s
interpretation of the common law as recognizing only a narrow forfeiture
doctrine. Three American cases decided between 1819 and 1879 held that
prior testimonial statements would be admissible if the witness “had been
kept away by the contrivance of the opposite party,” 148 “was detained by
means or procurement of the prisoner,” 149 or “is absent by [the

140

Harrison’s Case, (1692) 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851–52 (H. L.).
Id.
142
Lord Fenwick’s Case, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 594 (H.C.).
143
Id. “[N]o such thing [that Fenwick had tampered with the witness] hath been
proved . . . .” Id. at 606.
144
Queen v. Scaife, (1851) 17 Ad. E. 238, 242, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (Q.B.).
145
Id.
146
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2703 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147
See King v. Dingler, (1791) 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383; King v. Woodcock,
(1789) 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352.
148
Drayton v. Wells, 10 S.C.L. 409, 411 (1819).
149
Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 403 (1856).
141
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defendant’s] . . . own wrongful procurement.” 150 In a fourth American case,
the court admitted a witness’s prior statement where the witness had
testified before a justice and grand jury and was “sent away” by a friend of
the defendant “so that he could not be had to testify before the petit jury.” 151
None of these cases explicitly required a purpose-based mental state.
The Giles majority asserted that the forfeiture doctrine applied only in
cases of deliberate witness tampering from the “time of the founding” until
1985. 152 However, the first Supreme Court case to address forfeiture was
not until 1879, in Reynolds v. United States. 153 Reynolds itself relied on
leading English common law cases—Lord Morley’s Case, Harrison’s Case,
and Scaife. 154 However, given that the statement at issue in Reynolds was
former trial testimony that had been confronted, Reynolds’ analysis of the
statement was primarily a discussion of evidence law, not constitutional
law. 155
Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the defendant’s conduct in
Reynolds. There is no direct evidence of “purposeful” wrongful conduct to
150

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct.1775). Two leading evidentiary treatises
and a Delaware case reporter cite that case for the proposition that grand jury statements
were admitted on a wrongful-procurement theory. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2689 (citing
PHILLIPPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, at 200, n.(a); THOMAS PEAKE, COMPENDIUM
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 91, n.(m) (American ed. 1824); State v. Lewis, 1 Del. Cas. 608,
609 n.1 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1818)).
However, it is unclear whether the admitted statement was previously confronted or not.
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2689–90, see also 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting). While generally grand
jury proceedings were secret and thus the statements made were unconfronted by the
defendant, there is some evidence to suggest that the statements in Barber were confronted.
Id. (citing SARA SUN BEALE, ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.2 (2d ed. 2005));
see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2360, pp. 728–35
(John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961)); see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2690 n. 4. (“Three
commentators writing more than a century after the Barber decision, said, without
explanation, that they understood the case to have admitted only confronted testimony at a
preliminary examination.”); W. M. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 473,
n.(e) (American ed. 1883); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
161 (1902); 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1197, at 1024 (2d ed.
1913) (“We know of no basis for that understanding. The report of the case does not limit the
admitted testimony to statements that were confronted.”).
152
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687. In other circumstances, the Supreme Court has held a
defendant “forfeits” his Sixth Amendment confrontation right to be present at trial by
engaging in noncriminal disruptive conduct. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342–
43 (1970).
153
98 U.S. 145 (1879).
154
Id. at 158.
155
Id. at 161 (citing 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
§ 177, at 160–62).
151
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keep the witness away. Rather, there is evidence from which one could
reasonably infer that the defendant kept the witness away from the trial.
The facts indicate that when an officer went to the defendant’s home to
serve a subpoena on the witness who also resided there, the defendant said
the witness was not home and did not reveal the witness’s location to the
officer. 156 When the defendant was told that the witness would get into
trouble for making it difficult to subpoena her, the defendant replied that the
witness would not be in trouble until the subpoena was served. 157 Upon
these facts, the court decided to admit the witness’s former testimony in the
trial. At most, the defendant did not help the government serve the
subpoena. But such an omission, without an affirmative duty to assist the
officer, is not sufficient evidence to find the defendant purposely kept the
witness away. One could only speculate that the defendant had done
something to purposefully prevent the witness from being subpoenaed. But
as analysis of the defendant’s “intent,” the Reynolds Court only uses the
term “voluntarily” to describe the defendant’s mental state in “keep[ing] the
witnesses away.” 158
Justice Scalia concludes that the fact that the older common law cases
did not address forfeiture must mean that forfeiture required proof that the
defendant acted with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying,
and such proof was not present. 159 However, there are other inferences that
can be drawn from the lack of attention to forfeiture in these cases. To
begin, it may have been that the law was sufficiently undeveloped at the
time that the attorneys did not consider forfeiture as an alternative; this may
have been a particular barrier given that courts did not widely begin to
acknowledge many domestic violence crimes until relatively late in the
nineteenth century. 160 Especially if the law was inchoate in its protections
of victims, the attorneys may have made tactical decisions not to go forward
on a forfeiture theory.

156

Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 160.
158
Id.at 158.
159
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2684–86 (2008) (discussing King v. Woodcock,
(1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B.); King v. Dingler, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B.)).
160
See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as a Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118, 2124 (1996). Prior to reforms in the nineteenth century, laws in
England and the United States gave husbands the right to “chastise,” or corporally punish,
their wives. Id.
157
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In addition, it is an equally reasonable inference that there was no
well-established hearsay exception for forfeiture at the time. 161 In fact, the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not adopt a forfeiture hearsay exception until
1997. 162 Importantly, at the time of the framing, there was little or no
distinction between confrontation law and hearsay law in common law.
Thus, if dying declaration requirements are met, the statement was
admissible for evidentiary hearsay and constitutional confrontation
purposes. As it is now understood, the right to “confront” a witness is
actually a bundle of rights, including the right to be present and observe the
witness’s demeanor, the right to cross-examine, and the right that witnesses
testify under oath.163 Finally, cases discussed in Giles, including Woodcock
and Dingler, 164 are distinguishable in that the statements are only directly
related to the killing at issue, whereas in Giles, the statements are relevant
to prior potentially criminally punishable conduct, prior assault, and threats.
One early American case demonstrates a court’s explicit separation of
evidence law issues from constitutional confrontation issues. In McDaniel
v. State, 165 the court held the declarant’s prior statement admissible as a
161

It was Justice Scalia who in Crawford asserted that “we do not think the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence.”
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
162
Evidence law was primarily common law and only partly statutory before the Federal
Rules of Evidence were enacted. See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the
Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 909 (1978).
The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975. For a discussion of this
history of the development of the Rules, see Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The
Failure to See The Federal Rules of Evidence as a Codification of the Common Law, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1567–76 (1999).
The proposed forfeiture rule was approved by the Supreme Court on April 11, 1997, and
became effective on December 1, 1997, as FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 694, 708 (1997). There is one major distinction
between the evidentiary forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and the constitutional
confrontation doctrine. Any and all parties may invoke the evidentiary hearsay exception—
not only criminal prosecutors, but also criminal defendants, civil plaintiffs, and civil
defendants. By contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation resides solely with a
criminal defendant. Thus, while it is possible for the evidentiary rule to codify precisely
how the rule must apply when used against a criminal defendant, it is just as likely that the
rule reflects considerations regarding common law application of the forfeiture doctrine in
all contexts. The Advisory Committee supports this by noting that the wrongdoing not need
to be a criminal act to be sufficiently “wrong” and that forfeiture applied to all parties, even
the government. Id.
163
See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J, dissenting);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
164
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684–86 (discussing King v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep.
352 (K.B.); King v. Dingler, (1971) 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B.)).
165
McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401 (Miss. Err. & App. 1847).
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dying declaration. The defendant’s subsequent objection that admission of
the statement would nonetheless violate his confrontation right was
rejected. The court expressly held that the defendant’s confrontation rights
were not violated based on the forfeiture by wrongdoing principle.166
The Giles majority smoothly transitions from a discussion of the
common law’s narrow definition of forfeiture to the 1997 adoption in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. This seems a necessary and logical source of
information to examine. However, the Court’s legerdemain brings us back
to the very intertwining of evidentiary hearsay law and constitutional
confrontation analysis that it so boldly denounced in Crawford v.
Washington. 167 The Court uses its own opinion in Davis as a reference for
the proposition that the 1997 Federal Rules of Evidence forfeiture hearsay
exception in fact, codifies the forfeiture doctrine. 168 Oddly—and some
might say hypocritically—the Court is now using present day evidence law
to support an interpretation of the meaning of the constitutional
Confrontation Clause doctrine at the time of either the founding or the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment.
The entire Court, including those joining Justice Breyer’s dissent,
acknowledged that in both Crawford and Davis, the Court had “recognized”
the exception of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 169 Indeed, a 1791 evidence law
treatise noted that prior testimonial statements would be admitted if a
witness is “kept back from appearing by the means and procurement of the
prisoner.” 170 But a majority of the members of the Court did not agree with
Justice Scalia in Giles that this entails proof of a high level mental state,
such as purpose, as a predicate to forfeiture. Justices Souter and Ginsburg’s
concurrence concludes that the historical sources provide “substantial
indication” that the Confrontation Clause required “some degree of intent to
thwart the judicial process” before its protection would reasonably be

166

Id. at *8; see also Woodsides v. State, 2 Howard 655 (Miss. Err. App 1837). Recent
cases demonstrate how courts have continued to find no Confrontation Clause violation
when unconfronted statements were admitted under a forfeiture theory without evidence that
the defendant acted with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d.
1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
167
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . .”).
168
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680.
169
Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; Davis, 547 U.S.
at 833).
170
1 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 214–15 (1791); see also Fisher, supra
note 68.
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forfeited. 171 However, they seem to soften the impact of the majority’s
strict specific intent requirement by commenting that the “absence from the
early material of any reason to doubt that the element of intention would
normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic
abuser in the classic abusive relationship” who means to isolate the victim
and prevent the victim’s ability to reach out for help.172 Equity would
require, and the historical record would support, such a finding and a far
more flexible approach to forfeiture than Justice Scalia advances in his
majority opinion.
IV. THE DIFFICULTY WITH “PURPOSE” IN THE MODERN FORFEITURE
INQUIRY
In effect, the Giles majority holds that the prosecution must show that
a defendant had the “purpose” to prevent the witness from testifying in
order to assert forfeiture. At best, however, an examination of the history
of the common law is inconclusive regarding whether, and how, the
defendant’s purpose, or even arguably any mental state, matters to
forfeiture. Moreover, current understandings of “intent” in both criminal
law and evidence law would suggest that linking purpose to forfeiture leads
courts down a troubling path, especially if they construe intent in the
excessively narrow manner Justice Scalia suggests in Giles. Instead of
following only Justice Scalia’s restricted approach, lower courts should take
into account the proper common law understanding of intent in the
forfeiture context, as well as equity, especially as they apply the
Confrontation Clause.
A. WHY REQUIRE ANY MENTAL STATE FOR FORFEITURE?

Justice Breyer’s dissent in Giles argues that one reasonable
interpretation of the cases suggests that mere causation may be sufficient
for forfeiture. That is, if the defendant’s wrongful act caused the witness’s
absence, then the defendant has forfeited the right to confront that witness’s
prior testimonial statements. 173 Using the language from Lord Morley’s
Case allowing forfeiture when the witness was absent or detained “by
means or procurement of the prisoner,” 174 Justice Breyer argues that “[t]he

171
172
173
174

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
Id.
Id. at 2701 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr., at 771).
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phrase ‘by means of’ focuses on what the defendant did, not his motive for
(or purpose in) doing it.” 175
As the Giles dissent highlights, it is not at all clear why forfeiture
should be linked to any mental state. On several occasions within his
dissent, Justice Breyer focuses on the “causation” component of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing requirements. If the defendant could be shown to
have caused the witness’s unavailability to testify at trial, the causal link
may be sufficient to require him to forfeit his opportunity to confront.
Interestingly, however, Justice Breyer never extends his argument to its
logical conclusion: strict liability in the sense of automatic forfeiture where
a defendant’s conduct or activities makes a witness unavailable.
The primary objection to mere causation as a standard for forfeiture
stems from the same principle as the exception itself: it would not be
equitable to admit the evidence in some circumstances. If the only
requirement were that the defendant caused the witness’s unavailability,
then all of a homicide victim’s statements would be admissible, subject
only to the jurisdiction’s hearsay rules. In other cases, where the
wrongdoing consists of threats or bribes, this broad causation rule may not
provide the prosecution sufficient incentive to try to get the witness to
court. Or, for example, if the defendant were involved in a car accident that
caused the witness’s unavailability, it would not promote equitable
principles to use the unfortunate, but not culpable situation against the
defendant.
Indeed, early English criminal law based liability on essentially strict
liability, with no explicit requirement of a mental state. 176 If the state could
establish cause in fact, also known as “but for” causation, it was sufficient
to impose liability. But as the common law developed, it began to
incorporate concepts regarding moral wrongdoing and blameworthiness. 177
Criminal law today continues to develop ways of conceptualizing and
implementing the connection between moral blameworthiness, culpability,
and punishment. It is not surprising, therefore, to see a link between

175

Id. “In Diaz v. United States, which followed Reynolds, this Court used the word ‘by’
(the witness was absent “by the wrongful act of” the accused), a word that suggests
causation, not motive or purpose . . . . And in Motes v. United States, the Court spoke of
absence ‘with the assent of’ the defendant, a phrase perfectly consistent with an absence that
is a consequence of, not the purpose of, what the assenting defendant hoped to accomplish.”
Id. (citations omitted).
176
See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977–80 (1932) (tracing
the historical development of mental state requirements in criminal law).
177
See id. at 988–94 (1932) (discussing the influence of Roman and canon law on the
common law of crimes).

2010] FORFEITURE OF THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT IN GILES 1527
forfeiture and a mental state requirement. What is curious is to attribute the
connection retroactively to the common law, as does Justice Scalia.
Despite this argument, however, the difference of opinion between the
majority and dissent was not whether intent is required. Justice Breyer
ultimately seemed to concede that some level of intent is required.178 The
dissent, however, rejected the majority’s interpretation of “procurement” to
require proof of defendant’s “purpose” or “motive” as unpersuasive.179
Citing nineteenth century dictionaries and a treatise, the dissent was not
convinced by the majority’s interpretation of the terms “procurement” or
“contrivance.” 180 Both terms could be interpreted either to include only
purposeful conduct, or more generally any conduct which causes a result.181
The dissent emphasized that the only source which supported the majority’s
position was an evidence treatise which was written almost seventy years
after the founding. 182 Unlike other treatises cited in the opinion that, at
minimum, existed before the founding, the Powell treatise was first
published in 1858. 183
B. PARSING THE REQUISITE INTENT FOR FORFEITURE

Even if it were to be conceded that intent was, in some manner, the
touchstone of the common law of forfeiture, mental states in modern
criminal law are simply far more complicated than Justice Scalia suggests
in Giles. Modern courts continue to struggle with mental state issues, both
in analyzing an intangible concept, as well as in using language to express
that analysis. Commonly used lay words, such as “intent” or “knowing,”
become terms in legal analysis with very particular meanings. To add even
more complexity, courts, and now legislatures, continue to use these terms
inconsistently.
Proof of mental state is commonly established through inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence.184 To reinforce this notion, courts
178

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would apply a simple intent
requirement across the board.”).
179
Id. at 2701.
180
See supra notes 74–85 and accompanying text.
181
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2700–01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182
Id. at 2701–02; see also POWELL, supra note 85, at 166.
183
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
184
See Woodsides v. State, 2 Howard 655, 1837 WL 1084 (Miss. Err. & App 1837).
Evidence applied to proceedings in courts of justice consists of those facts or circumstances
connected with the legal proposition which establish its truth or falsehood. The use of the
weapon in the case supposed, is the fact or circumstance which establishes or manifests the
criminal intention. In a case where the declarations of the deceased are offered to the jury, they
constitute facts or circumstances to which the law imparts verity, and tend to establish the truth
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have often articulated a variant of the statement that “the jury is entitled to
presume that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his
acts.” 185 This encompasses analysis of evidence sufficient to prove not only
purpose, which is one of the highest levels of mental state, but also a lower
level of intent, such as knowing.
1. Standard of Proof
The equitable rationale for the forfeiture rule is to prevent defendants
from benefiting from their own wrongdoing. The Court was wary,
however, of a broad rule of admissibility. If the preliminary admissibility
threshold is based on the defendant’s wrongdoing, which is the alleged
criminal conduct at issue in the case, the preliminary judicial evidence
determination could unduly impinge on the jury’s guilt determination. 186
Thus, the Giles Court did not expand the rule any further than for those
actions “designed” to prevent a witness from testifying. 187
However, courts make preliminary determinations of admissibility
regularly without commenting on the relative weight or credibility of the
evidence. In the evidence context, the most clearly analogous example is
of the matter to which they relate. The position, therefore, that the declarations of the deceased,
in prosecutions for murder, are not admissible as evidence to establish the murder, is wholly
without foundation.

Id. at 665–66.
185
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2698 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515
U.S. 593, 613 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he jury is entitled to presume that a person
intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.”); Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492, 496 (1896) (“‘[A] man who performs an act which it is known will produce a particular
result is from our common experience presumed to have anticipated that result and to have
intended it.’”); see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 18, 38 (2d
ed. 1961) (“There is one situation where a consequence is deemed to be intended though it is
not desired. This is where it is foreseen as substantially certain.”); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1962) (stating that a person acts “knowingly” if “the element involves a
result of his conduct” and “he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result”); see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2704 (citing WILLIAMS, supra § 18, at 39)
(relying on sources at common law for the proposition that the accused “necessarily intends
that which must be the consequence of the act” (internal quotation marks omitted));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977) (“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout . . . to
denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a), at 341 (“[T]he traditional view is that a person who acts . . . intends
a result of his act . . . when he knows that that result is practically certain to follow from his
conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.”).
186
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2686. The Court noted, “It is akin, one might say, to ‘dispensing
with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.’” Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at
62).
187
Id. at 2683–84.
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the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 188 While the trial judge
must make an initial assessment that there is sufficient evidence to prove
the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence,189 it is the jury who
ultimately decides whether all the evidence proves the conspiracy beyond a
reasonable doubt. 190 In the constitutional context, even by the rule of Giles
itself, courts may be required to make preliminary determinations based on
the defendant’s culpability for the charged conduct. 191 For example, in a
judge’s pretrial admissibility determination, the burden for proffering a
prior testimonial statement of an unavailable witness under the forfeiture
doctrine would be a preponderance of the evidence, according to Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(a). 192 Even though a jury would apply the beyond a
reasonable doubt burden at trial, Justices Souter and Ginsburg found this
too close for comfort, acknowledging the distinction, but calling it a “near
circularity.” 193

188

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), cited in
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 n.6, 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189
In making the preliminary admissibility determination, the Federal Rules of Evidence
require the court to consider the contents of the statement. However, the contents of the
statement are “not alone sufficient to establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy and the
participation therein of the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered.”
FED. R. EVID. 801(d). The court must also consider “the circumstances surrounding the
statement, such as the identity of the speaker, the context in which the statement was made,
or evidence corroborating the contents of the statement . . . .” Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 694, 710 (1997).
190
FED. R. EVID. 104.
191
Justice Scalia concedes this point in Part II.D.2 of the majority opinion, which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined:
We do not say, of course, that a judge can never be allowed to inquire into guilt of the charged
offense in order to make a preliminary evidentiary ruling. That must sometimes be done under
the forfeiture rule that we adopt—when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering a
witness in order to prevent his testimony. But the exception to ordinary practice that we support
is (1) needed to protect the integrity of court proceedings, (2) based upon longstanding
precedent, and (3) much less expansive than the exception proposed by the dissent.

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 n.6.
192
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175. There is a split in the federal circuits and the states; some
apply the preponderance standard while other apply a clear-and-convincing standard. See
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 694, 719 (1997). In fairness to
prosecutors and victims who may be unavailable, however, some courts have not held that
the defendant’s intent be the sole purpose of the conduct. For example, the Second Circuit
has held that “[t]he government need not, however, show that the defendant’s sole
motivation was to procure the declarant’s absence; rather, it need only show that the
defendant ‘was motivated in part by a desire to silence the witness.’” United States v.
Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
193
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring).

1530

ELLEN LIANG YEE

[Vol. 100

2. “Motive” v. “Intent”
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Giles characterizes the majority as
incorrectly expanding the requirement for proof of mental state for
forfeiture from a simple “intent” to prevent the witness from testifying to a
“purpose” to keep the witness from testifying, in other words that the
defendant “acts from a particular motive, a desire to keep the witness from
trial.” 194 In describing forfeiture and its predicates, Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion uses terms such as “designed to prevent the witness from
testifying” or that a “purpose-based definition . . . governed.” 195
Certainly, it is harder to prove the more specific mental state of
“purpose” than the broader mental state of “intent.”196 But the dissent goes
even farther in suggesting that a negligent state of mind may even be
sufficient. 197 As Justice Breyer states, “no case limits forfeiture to instances
where the defendant’s purpose or motivation is to keep the witness
away.” 198 The majority tries to overcome this elementary legal logic by
claiming that the “forfeiture rule” applies, not where the defendant intends
to prevent the witness from testifying, but only where that is the defendant’s
purpose, i.e., that the rule applies only where the defendant “acts from a
particular motive, a desire to keep the witness from trial.” 199 Justice Breyer
emphasized “the law does not often turn matters of responsibility upon
motive, rather than intent. . . . [a]nd there is no reason to believe that
application of the rule of forfeiture constitutes an exception to this general
legal principle.” 200 The dissent also emphasized how not one single case
affirmatively holds that the Constitution limits the application of the
forfeiture doctrine by requiring proof that the defendant’s purpose or
motivation was to keep the witness from testifying at trial.201 Examining
194

Id. at 2698 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referencing id. at 2683–84).
Id. at 2698–99.
196
Id. (citing State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694, 702–03 (N.M. 2007) (finding it “doubtful
that evidence associated with the murder would support a finding that the purpose of the
murder was to keep the victim’s earlier statements to police from the jury”).
197
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And he does so whether he killed
her for the purpose of keeping her from testifying, with certain knowledge that she will not
be able to testify, or with a belief that rises to a reasonable level of probability. The inequity
consists of his being able to use the killing to keep out of court her statements against him.”).
198
Id. at 2700.
199
Id. at 2683–84 (asserting that the terms used to describe the scope of the forfeiture
rule “suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct
designed to prevent the witness from testifying” and that a “purpose-based definition . . .
governed”).
200
Id. at 2699.
201
Id. at 2700.
195
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the language used by the historical cases, Justice Breyer concludes that the
words actually suggest a focus on the defendant’s acts 202 that cause 203 the
“consequence” of the witness’s absence. 204
3. The Development of Mens Rea in Criminal Law
As punishment theory and ideas about criminal culpability have
developed and evolved over the past several hundred years, legislatures and
courts have begun to examine more carefully what mental state is required
for a defendant’s guilt. 205 Early in the development of criminal common
law, courts used several terms, often inconsistently, to describe the mental
state element—or mens rea—that the law required for culpability. For
example, courts used terms such as “malicious,” “willful,” “deliberate,” or
“intentional.” In addition, courts began to use categorical terms such as
“specific intent” or “general intent.” Today in modern American criminal
law, these terms are still used throughout all penal codes and many of them
are still used inconsistently.
Common law “intent” encompassed a broad range of mental states. At
common law, a person “intentionally” caused the social harm if “(1) it is his
desire (i.e., his conscious object) to cause the social harm; or (2) he acts
with knowledge that the social harm is virtually certain to occur as a result
of his conduct.” 206 By contrast, the Model Penal Code separates these
concepts into two levels of mens rea, “purpose” and “knowing.” 207 Both
are subjective determinations. 208
a. Concepts of Mens Rea
In criminal law, the term “intent” is often used to functionally
distinguish between what some courts call “specific intent” crimes and

202

Id. at 2701. Justice Breyer noted, “The phrase “by means of” focuses on what the
defendant did, not his motive for (or purpose in) doing it.” Id. (referring to Lord Morley’s
Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L.)).
203
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2701 (quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452 (1912)).
The witness was absent “by the wrongful act of” the accused. Id.
204
Id. at 2701 (Breyer, J., dissenting), referring to Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458,
473–74 (1900), where the Court spoke of absence “with the assent of” the defendant.
205
See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 117–80 (5th ed.
2009).
206
Id. at 121 (citing Thornton v. State, 919 A.2d 678 (Md. 2007)).
207
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a)-(b) (1985); see also id. at cmt. 2 (citing Walter
Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L. J. 645 (1917);
Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 910–11 (1939)).
208
DRESSLER, supra note 205, at 121–22.
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“general intent” crimes. 209 However, widely inconsistent usage of these
terms has caused, and continues to cause, confusion and lack of clarity in
the interpretation and application of criminal law. Despite the imprecision
of this terminology, many jurisdictions continue to use this language to
discuss mens rea. 210 In part because of the problematic nature of this
terminology, the Model Penal Code does not use these words and
jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Penal Code’s mens rea
terminology similarly do not typically use these terms. 211
There is no universally accepted meaning of “general intent” or
“specific intent.” There are, however, a few common approaches. The first
could be characterized as the relatively traditional or historical approach.
Traditionally, courts used the term “general intent” to describe the requisite
mens rea when no particular mental state is set out in the definition of the
crime. 212 Under this application of mens rea, the prosecution must prove
only that the actus reus of the crime was performed with a morally
“blameworthy state of mind.” 213 By contrast, traditionally courts used the
term “specific intent” to describe a mental state which is expressly set out in
the definition of the crime. 214 Specific intent encompasses “purpose”—the
term Justice Scalia has in mind in describing forfeiture.
The second approach is more hierarchical and elemental in its
interpretation and application of these terms. Under this approach, courts
use the term “specific intent” to describe an offense with a higher level
mens rea term, such as purpose, while using the term “general intent” to
refer to offenses that permit conviction on less culpable mental states such
as knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. 215
The third approach is commonly used in modern criminal law. As
criminal law has evolved and been codified by legislatures, many statutes
expressly include an identifiable mens rea element term, or a particular state
of mind is judicially implied, so the line between “general” and “specific” is
more difficult. 216 Many modern courts use the term “specific intent” to

209

Id. at 137–39.
See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and
Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 341 (2001) (stating that a majority
of states and the federal system continue to use the distinction between general and specific
intent in analyzing criminal culpability).
211
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt 1 (1985); see also Batey, supra note 210 at 400–01.
212
DRESSLER, supra note 205, at 138.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
210
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refer to any mental element which is required to be proven above and
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus, or conduct,
of the crime. 217 Here are three descriptive examples. First, if the statute
“includes an intent or purpose to do some future act,” separate from the
requisite actus reus of the crime, it may be considered a specific intent
crime. 218 For example, many burglary statutes prohibit a person from
entering a structure with intent to commit a felony therein.219
Another example includes statutes where the defendant is to “achieve
some further consequence beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the
actus reus of the offense,” that is to say, a special motive or purpose for
committing the actus reus. 220 For example, to be culpable for larceny, one
must take property with intent to permanently deprive the owner of that
property. Finally, a statute may be considered a specific intent offense if it
provides that the actor must be aware of the statutory attendant
circumstance. 221 For example, to be guilty of the crime of receiving stolen
property, the defendant must know that the property is stolen property.
This third approach uses the term “general intent” to describe a mens
rea element for any mental state, whether express or implied, in the
definition of the offense that relates to the acts that constitute the criminal
offense. 222 More simply, after identifying that a “specific intent” or “strict
liability” offense is not at issue, courts may categorize all other offenses as
“general intent” crimes.
b. The Model Penal Code
In 1952, the American Law Institute met to create a model code that
would help guide lawmakers, both legislators and judges, to develop their
criminal jurisprudence. The Model Penal Code has endeavored to provide a
coherent structure to the analysis of mens rea. Clearly, one of the most
influential aspects of the Model Penal Code has been the sections related to
mens rea. In § 2.02 of the Code, the writers identify and classify four levels
of mental state: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. 223 Each
mens rea element is defined to apply to the circumstance in which the actor

217
Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980); United States v. Blair,
54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995); Harris v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 183 (Md. 1999)).
218
Id.
219
See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE § 713.1 (2003).
220
DRESSLER, supra note 205, at 138.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 139.
223
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
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“acts” 224 with respect to a “material element of an offense.” 225 In other
words, the mens rea applies specifically to a material element of conduct,
result, or attendant circumstance.226
§2.02 General Requirements of Culpability.
***
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined. 227

224

Id. at § 1.13 (“General Definitions. In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is
required: . . . (2) ‘act’ or ‘action’ means a bodily movement whether voluntary or
involuntary; (3) ‘voluntary’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.01; (4) ‘omission’ means
a failure to act[.]”).
225
Id. at § 1.13, § 2.02.
In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(5) “conduct” means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where
relevant, a series of acts and omissions;
***
(9) “element of an offense” means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or (iii)
such a result of conduct as
(a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; or
(b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or
(c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or
(d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or
(e) establishes jurisdiction or venue[.]
(10) “material element of an offense” means an element that does not relate exclusively to the
statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue, or to any other matter similarly unconnected with (i)
the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or
(ii) the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct[.]
226

See id. at § 2.02(4) (“Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material
Elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is
sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material
elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense,
unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”).
227
See also id. at § 2.02(2)(c) and (d) defining “recklessly” and “negligently,”
respectively.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
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(a) Purposely. 228
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of
such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly. 229
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he
is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

To compare, “purposely” focuses on the actor’s “conscious object” to
engage in conduct or to cause a result, whereas “knowingly” focuses on the
actor’s “aware[ness].” Both the “purposely” and “knowingly” categories
use similar language to define the requisite mental state regarding an
attendant circumstance: that the actor is “aware” of the existence of such
circumstances. However, “purposely” seems to broaden the definition of
awareness to include instances where the actor simply “believes or hopes
that [the attendant circumstances] exist.” 230 The distinction between
purpose and knowledge is clarified, in part, by § 2.02(7), which allows the
requirement of knowledge to be satisfied by the awareness of a high
probability. The Code states, “when knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if

his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s
situation.
228

See also id. § 1.13(11) (“General Definitions. In this Code, unless a different
meaning plainly is required: (11) ‘purposely’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and
equivalent terms such as ‘with purpose,’ ‘designed’ or ‘with design’ have the same
meaning.”).
229
See also id. § 2.02(8) (“Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A
requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly
with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further
requirements appears.”).
230
Id. at § 2.02(2)(a)(ii) (emphasis added).
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a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually
believes that it does not exist.” 231
Even though the Model Penal Code has limited the mental state terms
to a hierarchy of four levels—purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and
negligently—it accommodates, in part, a variety of mental state terms that
preceded it. Thus, according to the Model Penal Code, “‘intentionally’ or
‘with intent’ means purposely.” 232 Two quotes from the Giles majority
seem to incorporate this view. For example, Justice Scalia states, “Every
commentator we are aware of has concluded the requirement of intent
‘means that the exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the
particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.’” 233 Further the
majority writes, “The commentators come out this way because the
dissent’s claim that knowledge is sufficient to show intent is emphatically
not the modern view.” 234 Indeed, it is not the “modern” view. But this
point is in complete contradiction to Justice Scalia’s insistence that the
scope of the confrontation right and its exceptions are defined by
parameters in place at the time of the founding.
C. INFERRING INTENT

For a justice system to deprive a criminal defendant of a constitutional
right, fairness requires an adequate justification. To that end, all the
Justices agree that something more than merely causing the witness’s
absence is required before a defendant is held to have forfeited the right of
confrontation. Closely examining each of the five opinions in Giles, one
can cobble together common ground from the differing viewpoints.
Although the reasoning for establishing the boundaries of this common
ground differ, the diversity of rationales actually reinforce one another,
giving more stable guidance to lower courts.
The constitutional right grants the right to a procedure: confrontation.
As with other constitutional rights, the confrontation right can be waived. 235
231

Id. at § 2.02(7).
Id. at § 1.13(12).
233
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2687–88 (2008) (citing 5 CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:134 (3d ed. 2007); 5 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.03[7][b] (J.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); 2 KENNETH S. BROWN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 176 (6th
ed. 2006)).
234
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2688 (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.2 (2d ed. 2003)).
235
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938) (holding that a valid waiver is “ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege” by the accused).
232
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As in a guilty plea, a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver effectively
waives the right of confrontation. 236 However, as with other constitutional
rights, a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights may be impliedly
waived, or forfeited. For example, those convicted of a felony may lose
their Second Amendment right to carry guns 237 or their right to vote. 238
Similarly, the forfeiture of a right to confrontation by wrongdoing is an
implied or imputed waiver. The right of confrontation is imputedly waived
when a defendant is voluntarily absent from trial 239 or is so disruptive to the
court proceedings that removal from the courtroom is necessary. 240 The
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception relies upon a similar rationale for
depriving the defendant of the confrontation right—that the defendant’s
own conduct justifies the forfeiture.
1. The Problem with Purpose
Justice Breyer’s dissent correctly observes that basing the forfeiture
rule on proof of the defendant’s purpose rather than intent “creates serious
practical evidentiary problems.” 241 Given that there is no clear precedent
that compels the Court to require purpose rather than intent, the dissent
criticizes the inference the majority draws from an absence in the history of
cases. Put simply, there is too little precedent to draw firm conclusions.242
Indeed, Justice Breyer finds the majority’s requirement of purpose or
motive to be inconsistent with the “basically ethical objective” of the
forfeiture exception. 243 If the defendant is able to keep the witness from
testifying in court, he has “take[n] advantage of his own wrong” 244 whether
236

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).
238
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974); see also Angela Behrens, Voting—
Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon
Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2004).
239
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 (1973).
240
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1970); see also Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 837 (1975) (holding that Sixth Amendment rights are personal to the accused).
241
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2699 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242
Id. at 2704 (citing LANGBEIN, supra note 130, at 248).
243
Id. at 2699. Justice Breyer highlights that the State only introduced the unconfronted
statements to rebut the defendant’s affirmative defense of self-defense: “To rebut the
defendant’s claim of self-defense and impeach his testimony, the State introduced into
evidence the witness’ earlier uncross-examined statements (as state hearsay law permits it to
do) to help rebut the defendant’s claim of self-defense.” Id. at 2695. While not an actual
factor in the forfeiture analysis, Justice Breyer seems to consider the broader context of
equity in the case as a whole. It was the defendant who raised the very issue that prompted
the prosecution to use the testimonial evidence.
244
Id. at 2696. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)).
237
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the act was done purposely, knowingly, or even with a reasonable belief.
Using the killing to exclude the victim’s statement from trial constitutes an
inequity, if done with any of these mental states. 245 According to Justice
Breyer, requiring “evidence that [the defendant] was focused on his future
trial” produces “incongru[ous]” results. 246
In contrast, focusing on intent, the dissent argues for also applying
forfeiture to a defendant with knowledge of the result of his wrongful
conduct. 247 Most importantly, the dissent argues that “the relevant cases
suggest that the forfeiture rule would apply where the witness’s absence
was the known consequence of the defendant’s intentional wrongful act.”248
Thus, the dissent asserts that the requisite intent is, in fact, established on
the facts of Giles: The intent to procure the absence of the witness is
established by proof of knowledge that the defendant’s wrongdoing actions
will cause the witness’s absence. 249
2. Clarifying Muddy Forfeiture Waters
Justice Breyer’s dissent takes the position that unconfronted
testimonial statements may not have been admissible under the forfeiture
doctrine at the time of the founding, but are admissible today. 250 He offers
several alternative explanations for the absence of forfeiture arguments in
dying declaration cases. As he suggests, courts have failed to explicitly
separate three discrete, but interrelated, issues that continue to muddy the
analytical waters of forfeiture: (a) unavailability of a witness; (b) evidence
law and its hearsay exceptions, and (c) the constitutional issues presented
by the Confrontation Clause.
At the time of the founding, courts discussed three legally sufficient
ways to establish a witness’s unavailability to testify in person, in court at a
criminal defendant’s trial.251 Proving a witness was dead demonstrated that
245

Id. at 2698.
Id. at 2699. Setting a lower constitutional barrier for the admission of this evidence
does not replace the opportunity for jurisdictions to limit the admissibility even further
through evidence law. Id. at 2700.
247
Id. at 2705.
248
Id. at 2701. Justice Breyer went on to note, “Rather than limit forfeiture to instances
where the defendant’s act has absence of the witness as its purpose, the relevant cases
suggest that the forfeiture rule would apply where the witness’ absence was the known
consequence of the defendant’s intentional wrongful act.” Id.
249
Id. at 2697–98.
250
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2706.
251
At the time of the founding, courts also recognized certain evidentiary privileges that
rendered the witness legally unavailable to testify. See Note, Developments in the Law—
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1455–58 (1985) (citations omitted).
246
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it was factually impossible for the witness to appear and testify at trial.252
Courts could have decided that a witness’s death would be the only
circumstance in which alternative forms of evidence from the witness
would be admitted, but they did not. In addition to death, courts were
willing to consider evidence other than live testimony from a witness who
was either “unable to travel” or “kept away by the means or procurement of
the prisoner.” 253 The scope of what circumstances rendered the witness
sufficiently “unable to travel” at the time of the founding would likely be
very different from what modern courts would find now. Finally, even a
witness who is alive and able to travel may still be legally unavailable to
testify at trial because the witness was “kept back from appearing by the
means and procurement” of the defendant. 254 Thus, even though it may be
physically possible for the witness to appear, the witness is practically
absent and courts found that a legally sufficient reason to characterize the
witness as unavailable to testify.
Historically, the preferred form of witness evidence was live, in court,
sworn testimony. However, if a witness had previously made statements
out of court and the statements were being offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted within the statements, evidence law generally excluded the

For hearsay purposes in modern evidence law, other circumstances also satisfy the
unavailability requirement. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804.
Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable
(a) Definition of unavailability. “Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the
declarant—
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning
the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure
the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2),
(3), or (4), the declarant’s attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory,
inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for
the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
252
See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770
(H.L. 1666); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 425, 429 (4th
ed. 1762)).
253
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683.
254
See GILBERT, supra note 170, at 214–15.
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reiteration of those statements at trial. The rationale for exclusion was
based on assumptions about the credibility and reliability of such
statements. Given that such statements were likely not made under oath
and subject to cross-examination, the information was considered less
reliable. 255 There were, however, exceptions.
Three exceptions are particularly relevant to our discussion here. First,
an exception was made for the witness’s prior testimony. While perhaps
not as informative as live testimony, prior testimony was sworn and
considered sufficiently reliable.256 Second, an exception was made for a
witness’s dying declaration. 257 The rationale was that the witness would
have no motive to lie if he were about ready to meet his maker. 258 Third, an
exception was made for a witness’s prior statement, regardless of the
content or the circumstances of the statement, if the witness was unavailable
because he was “kept away by the means or procurement of the
prisoner.” 259
All the other exceptions to the modern hearsay rule are based on the
assumption that circumstances make the statement sufficiently reliable to be
fairly considered in accurately determining the defendant’s culpability. 260
The underlying reasoning for the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
hearsay rule is completely different. 261 It is based not on assumptions of the

255

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “[A]t common law, there existed
both oath-based and cross-examination-based rationales for the hearsay rule, with the latter
only becoming dominant around the turn of the 19th century.” Id. (citing LANGBEIN, supra
note 130, at 245–246, nn. 291–92).
256
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250 (1895) (finding no Confrontation Clause
violation to admit the transcribed copy of the reporter’s stenographic notes of the prior
testimony of two deceased witnesses at defendant’s retrial for murder because the witnesses
were sworn and cross-examined).
257
King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 501, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352–53 (1789).
258
See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44. The Court noted, “[T]he sense of impending death is
presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the
truth as would the obligation of an oath.” Id. at 244.
259
JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 85 (1822).
260
Anthony Bocchino & David Sonenshein, Rule 804(B)(6)—The Illegitimate Child Of
The Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule and Confrontation Clause, 73 MO. L. REV. 41,
41–53 (2008).
261
Other types of statements, which fall within the definition of hearsay as defined by
FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c), are expressly excluded from the definition. Certain prior
statements by a witness who testifies at trial and admissions by a party-opponent are
excluded. Id. at. 801(d). Admissions by a party-opponent are admissible “on the theory that
their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system.” Id. at 801 advisory
committee note. Like the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, the rationale of the
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reliability of the content of the statements, but rather on the overarching
concept of equity—that it would be unfair to allow a defendant to benefit
from the defendant’s own effort to interfere with the judicial process.
Justice Breyer argues for a broader, more permissive constitutional
rule and then suggests that jurisdictions can adopt a narrower hearsay
rule. 262 While the constitutional right to confrontation may be valued more
highly than the evidentiary issue of reliability, it does not compel a more
restrictive standard. 263 The dissent’s firm reminder to disentangle the
constitutional and evidentiary issues is essential. While related, they must
be considered separately. Such separation proves difficult, as even the
Giles majority reverted back to using evidence law to comment on the
constitutional question. 264 The Giles majority, surprisingly in light of
Crawford’s directive to separate evidentiary concerns from constitutional
concerns, attempts to rebut the State’s explanation that the standard for a
constitutional confrontation forfeiture exception may have been a different
standard than the evidentiary hearsay forfeiture exception standard, by
reconnecting the two and stating that they “stem from the same roots.”265
In Crawford, the Court reoriented its perspective on the Confrontation
Clause back to the founding. In doing so, the Court determined that the
focus of the Confrontation Clause was on the procedural guarantee rather
than the substantive result of reliability. In conferring a right to a criminal
defendant to “confront the witnesses against him,” the Confrontation Clause
was meant to provide the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. Again, courts could have decided that this rule was absolute but
they did not. In Crawford, the Court acknowledged that exceptions existed
at the time of the founding. One exception was for dying declarations.
Another was for circumstances that satisfied a constitutional “forfeiture by
wrongdoing” standard. The scope of this exception, in the context of
constitutional interpretation, is what is at issue in Giles.

admissions by a party-opponent rule is based on principles of fairness and equity rather than
trustworthiness. See id.
262
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2694, 2700 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
263
The Confrontation Clause does not protect a defendant from unreliable but
constitutionally-admissible nontestimonial hearsay if it is admissible according to the
applicable rules of evidence. This allows the rules of evidence, which are determined by a
more democratic political process, to set the boundaries of admissibility. Structurally, this
allows the courts interpreting the Constitution to set the minimum requirements and the
legislatures and rule-making bodies have the ability to develop further requirements. Justice
Scalia’s own preference for judicial restraint would arguably point him toward a standard
that would allow the democratic political process to decide these issues.
264
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687–88.
265
Id. at 2686 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
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Justice Breyer characterizes the practice of admitting unconfronted
statements under the forfeiture exception as a recent evidentiary
development. 266 However, some may argue that even Justice Breyer’s
position does not go far enough to protect victims. Justice Breyer
consistently refers to the severe circumstances when a defendant has
rendered the witness unavailable by killing the witness, stating “the relevant
circumstances . . . are likely to arise almost exclusively when the defendant
murders the witness” 267 and “[o]rdinarily a murderer would know that his
victim would not be able to testify at a murder trial.” 268 Justice Breyer
quotes Justice Souter’s concurrence which considered the application of the
forfeiture exception within the domestic violence context and hypothesized
using evidence of a “classic abusive relationship” to infer the requisite
purposive intent for the forfeiture doctrine.269
3. The Forfeiture Exception in Domestic Violence Cases
At its core, forfeiture’s equitable roots are designed to protect against
wrongdoing. While all the Justices recognize this goal, the Giles opinions
place different emphasis on the types of wrongdoing and the consequences
of each type. The allegedly criminal conduct at issue at trial may or may
not be the wrongdoing that constitutes grounds for forfeiture. There are
several possible scenarios. First, a witness’s testimonial statements can
describe allegedly criminal conduct that is the basis for a criminal charge.
If followed by the defendant’s subsequent wrongdoing that procures the
witness’s absence for a court proceeding on the issue of the criminality of
that prior conduct, the question before the trial court is whether the
testimonial statements relevant to the initial criminal conduct can be
admissible. In a second scenario, the testimonial statements describe
allegedly criminal conduct that is precisely the conduct claimed to be the
defendant’s wrongdoing that procures the witness’s absence. The court
would need to make a preliminary determination regarding the wrongdoing
as grounds for admitting the testimonial statement for the culpability of the
defendant for the same conduct. Third, like Giles, prior testimonial
statements can describe a prior, uncharged incident. If the defendant then
engages in allegedly criminal conduct that also constitutes the wrongdoing
which procures the witness’s absence, the issue is the admissibility of the

266
267
268
269

Id. at 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2707.
Id. at 2708.
Id.
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prior statements which relate indirectly to the defendant’s culpability for the
charged conduct.
The forfeiture exception is concerned with and related to the
obstruction of the judicial process. As the majority fairly emphasizes in
Giles, the wrongdoing is limited to conduct “designed to prevent a witness
from testifying.” 270 At the core of the forfeiture exception, therefore, is the
purpose of protecting the integrity of court proceedings. However, Justice
Scalia’s narrowing of forfeiture, based on a misreading of the common law,
goes too far. Justice Souter’s concurrence adopted a broader approach to
forfeiture, emphasizing equity. Similarly, the dissent cited cases in other
areas of law that illustrate the underlying equitable principle of forfeiture:
that regardless of the purpose of the defendant’s killing, the result is that the
defendant is denied any benefit associated with killing. 271
In each of the three scenarios described above, the prosecution would
use the testimonial hearsay to help prove the charged conduct. Proving the
defendant had any intent to prevent the declarant from future testimony is
an easier inference to make in the first two scenarios, and perhaps more
difficult to make in the third. However, when the subsequent wrongdoing
is killing, as in Giles, and both incidents are related to an ongoing
relationship of violence, the inference of the defendant’s mental state could
be equally compelling. As the majority describes, the purpose of a
forfeiture rule is to prevent “an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe,
intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.” 272
Especially in contexts involving complex relationship dynamics
between the defendant on the witness, such as domestic violence and gangrelated cases,273 courts should not strictly adopt Justice Scalia’s
270
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2686 (Souter, J., concurring). “But as the evidence amply shows,
the ‘wrong’ and the ‘evil Practices’ to which these statements referred was conduct designed
to prevent a witness from testifying.” Id.
271
To analogize, Justice Breyer referenced other areas of law that are based on equitable
principles and treat wrongdoing similarly. For example, neither the life insurance proceeds
nor the assets of the inheritance is given to the killer, irrespective of the finding that the killer
killed for the insurance or inheritance assets. Id. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
272
Id. at 2686 (Souter, J., concurring).
273
In United States v. Miller, a gang-related case, the court stated that “although a
‘finding that [defendants’] purpose was to prevent [a declarant from] testifying,’ is relevant,
such a finding is not required.” 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997). For further discussion of
this issue, see Yee, supra note 10. See also Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage
Done by Crawford v. Washington: Three Constructive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
521, 522 (2010) (citing Witness Intimidation: Showdown in the Streets—Breakdown in the
Courts, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 25 (1994) (statement of Gerald Shur, Senior Associate Director,
Office of Enforcement Operations, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
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unjustifiably rigid approach to forfeiture but should use an approach that is
more flexible and considers intent and equity in the context of institutional
factors that might motivate a defendant to make a witness unavailable. This
would ultimately suggest that a defendant’s knowing conduct that leads to
unavailability can still trigger forfeiture, even if there is no overt purpose or
specific intent.
For example, Professor Tom Lininger has attempted to bring some
coherence to this area and its implication for domestic violence cases,
where witnesses are frequently unavailable to testify due to some conduct
of the defendant. He proposes that intent be inferred in the following three
circumstances: violation of a restraining order issued for the victim’s
protection; 274 the commission of a violent act against the victim during the
pendency of judicial proceedings; 275 and when there is a history of “abuse
and isolation.” 276 These factors provide a much more useful approach to
addressing forfeiture than focusing on a singular assessment of purpose.
However, given that the confrontation right applies in all criminal cases, not
just domestic violence, 277 the Court has rightly strived to set a standard
clear enough to be applied, yet flexible enough to address unforeseen
circumstances. 278
Although six Justices joined the majority and three joined the dissent,
the nine Justices of the Giles Court actually impliedly share some common
ground in requiring proof of some mental state for forfeiture by
wrongdoing. It is this narrow common ground that lower courts should
274

Lininger, supra note 15, at 898.
Id. at 900.
276
Id.; see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Control Killings, 87 TEX. L. REV. 117 (2009)
(urging courts to focus on the connection between the pattern of past domestic violence and
present killing in considering the defendant’s intent to silence the witness).
277
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693. As Justice Scalia caustically accuses the dissent, “Is the
suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and
Crawford described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for
those crimes that are frequently directed against women?”
278
Contrast the more severe proposal recommended by Professor Donald Dripps who
suggests revising the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule to provide a
presumption of forfeiture when the defendant previously assaulted the witness or the
witness’s family. The amended Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) would provide:
275

In a criminal case, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused, at any time,
assaulted an unavailable witness, or threatened to inflict physical harm upon an unavailable
witness or any member of the witness’s immediate family, the court may presume forfeiture of
both hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections. This presumption may be rebutted by proof
by a preponderance that the accused did not engage in, and did not acquiesce in, wrongdoing
intended to cause the witness not to testify.

Dripps, supra note 273, at 557.
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look to in interpreting and applying Giles’ forfeiture by wrongdoing
analysis. 279 While Justice Scalia’s opinion makes a case for interpreting the
intent required to be purposive intent only, a fair reading of the common
law at the time of the founding construes intent to encompass both
purposive and knowing mental states. 280 Such a reading is not inconsistent
with the analysis by Justices Souter and Ginsburg in their concurrence,
which acknowledged that the historical evidence was not clear. 281
However, as Justice Souter stated, “Equity demands something more than
this near circularity before the right to confrontation is forfeited, and more
is supplied by showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying.” 282
Moreover, the three Justices joined in the dissent share this common
ground: that the forfeiture doctrine requires the prosecution to prove the
defendant’s intent.283 But the dissent broadly outlines the government’s
burden, stating “that the prosecution in such a case need show no more than
intent (based on knowledge) to do so.” 284
The common ground among a majority of the Justices in Giles
becomes even firmer in the domestic violence context. 285 Importantly, the
279

In Giles, four of the six Justices who joined the majority wrote or joined concurring
opinions. One scholar has suggested that a simple concurrence “should be granted
precedential weight to the extent that it is numerically necessary to procure a majority and
that it is compatible with the majority opinion.” Igor Kirman, Standing Apart to Be a Part:
The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083,
2805 (1995). Justices Souter and Ginsburg were necessary to form a majority in Giles and
the equitable approach discussed in their concurrence is compatible with Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion.
Note also, as is well-established, an opinion of the Supreme Court with no clear majority
on both result and reasoning should, at a minimum, be read narrowly. Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [the majority], the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotations omitted)). For a normative defense of this
“narrowest grounds” approach to constitutional interpretation see Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 321 (2000) (using social choice theory to explain why the narrowest-ground
approach to interpreting plurality and fragmented vote cases is desirable).
280
See supra notes 205–222 and accompanying text.
281
See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
282
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring).
283
Id. at 2701–02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
284
Id. at 2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
285
Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg) (supporting Part II.E of the
majority opinion); see Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent:
An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552 (2007); Tuerkheimer, supra
note 276; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic
Violence Context,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711 (2009).

1546

ELLEN LIANG YEE

[Vol. 100

majority decision itself specifically addresses the application of its
interpretation of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule in the domestic violence
context. 286 Justice Scalia himself observed:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to
outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or
cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates
in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to
isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or
cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible
under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade
the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as
would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been
expected to testify. 287

Although the majority quibbles with the dissent, denying that such an
analysis is “nothing more than ‘knowledge-based intent,’” 288 the semantic
differences cannot overshadow the fundamental agreement demonstrated by
this description. Whether one calls it inferred intent or knowledge-based
intent, practically this includes a mental state that is broader than explicit
purpose, but excludes a mental state that is only objectively negligent. As
the concurrence further describes the level of intent required in a domestic
abuse case, the Sixth Amendment simply requires “some degree of intent to
thwart the judicial process[.]” 289
To illustrate what evidence would suffice to prove that requisite level
of intent the concurrence suggests that “the element of intention would
normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic
abuser in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the
victim from outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the
judicial process.” 290 The three Justices joined in the dissent quote this
language in agreement, 291 commenting further that
a showing of domestic abuse is sufficient to call into play the protection of the
forfeiture rule in a trial for murder of the domestic abuse victim. Doing so when, in
fact, the abuser may have had other matters in mind apart from preventing the witness
from testifying, is in effect not to insist upon a showing of “purpose.” 292

286

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692–93.
Id. at 2693. The Court sent the case back to allow the trial court to consider the intent
of the defendant on remand. Id.
288
Id.
289
Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring).
290
Id.
291
Id. at 2708. (“Consequently, I agree with this formulation, though I would apply a
simple intent requirement across the board.”).
292
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
287
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V. CONCLUSION
Judicial philosophies are based in part on the degree to which the
judge’s interpretive method gives weight to the extra-textual sources of
information and the degree to which the judge is dedicated to preserving the
application of the original meaning in the present context. As a textualist
and an originalist, Justice Scalia works to identify the original meaning of
the constitutional text and then attempts to apply that historical meaning to
the present-day issue before the Court. Other Justices on the Court have
been less reliant on history as a primary source for information about the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 293 For example, Justice Breyer’s
jurisprudence is founded on the idea that the Constitution is a document that
was written to adapt to the present circumstances of an issue before the
Court by the Court’s consideration of the purposes of the law and the likely
consequences of its interpretation. 294
Elsewhere, Justice Scalia has revealed that, in a crunch, he may be a
“faint-hearted” originalist.295 This label has generated much criticism,
particularly within the originalist camp of constitutional interpretation.
Whatever one’s larger views of constitutional methodology, however, to the
extent constitutional interpretation relies on descriptions of the common law
it should make every effort to describe it fairly and accurately. In the case
of forfeiture, the common law foundations of Justice Scalia’s constitutional
interpretation are based on an absence of cases, not on well-established
common law principles. That is not a very solid foundation for any
originalist method to discern constitutional meaning.
As I have argued in this Article, the common law principles, best
understood through the history, do not support Justice Scalia’s inference
about how the common law of forfeiture applies. In this recent opinion in
the Crawford line of cases, Justice Scalia may have revealed himself as not
only a faint-hearted originalist, but as a faint-hearted scholar of the common
293
For example, Justice Thomas wrote, “There is virtually no evidence of what the
drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 n.8
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). In Green, Justice Harlan noted, “[T]he Confrontation
Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into [its]
intended scope . . . .” Green, 399 U.S. at 173–74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
294
See, e.g., JUSTICE STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (describing an interpretive approach based on the
principle of “active liberty” which endeavors to enable democracy); Stephen Breyer, On
Handguns and the Law, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug. 19, 2010 (excerpt from STEVEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010)) (discussing how history
is an insufficient resource for interpreting the Constitution)).
295
Scalia, supra note 19.
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law. In the context of longstanding legal processes, like the criminal law, if
these premises are not an accurate basis for an originalist interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause, that interpretation is left with a shifting and weak
foundation. In fact, the forfeiture doctrine has a long history and its
common law foundations are not nearly as narrow as Justice Scalia
suggested. Given that the Court’s decision in Giles is itself highly
fragmented on its reasoning, lower courts and litigants have a firm ground
for reading the decision on the narrowest grounds and interpreting forfeiture
more expansively than Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Giles appears to
invite. Considering Justice Scalia’s own example regarding domestic
violence cases, 296 it would seem especially important that courts be aware
that “design” or “purpose” can be established by circumstantial evidence
that the witness’s absence is a known consequence of the defendant’s acts.

296

See supra note 287.

